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Crimes
Crimes; accident reports
Vehicle Code § 20001 (amended).
SB 2374 (Lockyer); 1988 STAT. Ch 1207
Sponsor: Attorney General's Office; California Peace Officers
Association; California Highway Patrol
Opposition: American Civil Liberties Union; California Attorneys
for Criminal Justice
Under existing law, the driver of any vehicle involved in an accident
resulting in injury or death must immediately stop at the scene of
the accident and provide certain information' to any injured person
and render reasonable assistance.2 Existing law punishes any driver
who fails to comply with these requirements by imprisonment in the
state prison or county jail for up to one year or by a fine up to
$10,000, or both.' Chapter 1207 increases the punishment to impris-
onment in the state prison for two, three, or four years if the accident
results in death or permanent, serious injury.4
JMS
1. The driver must give the other driver or occupants of any involved vehicle or any
police officer at the scene of the accident the following information: (1) Name, (2) address,
(3) vehicle registration number, (4) driver license number, if requested, and (5) the name of
the owner of the vehicle. CAL. VEH. CODE § 20003(a),(b). If any person in the accident dies,
the driver, if there is no police officer present, must report the accident and supply the required
information to the nearest California Highway Patrol office or duly authorized police authority.
Id. § 20004.
2. Id. § 20001(a), (b). Reasonable assistance includes the carrying or making of arrange-
ments for the carrying of injured persons to a physician, surgeon, or hospital for medical
treatment if such treatment is necessary or requested. Id. § 20003(a).
3. Id. § 20001(b)(1).
4. Id. § 20001(b)(2) (permanent, serious injury means loss or permanent impairment of
function of any bodily member or organ).
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Crimes; AIDS testing results-disclosure
Health and Safety Code § 199.24 (new); § 199.21, 199.22 (amended).
AB 3255 (Jones); 1988 STAT. Ch. 1582
Support: California Medical Association; California Dental Asso-
ciation; California Association of Hospital and Health Systems;
Women's Lobby; California Dialysis Council
Opposition: California Nurses Association; Health Officer's As-
sociation of California; American Civil Liberties Union; Lobby
for Individual Freedom and Equality
Under existing law, negligently or willfully disclosing' the results
of a blood test to detect the probable causative agent of acquired
immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) is a crime giving rise to a civil
cause of action,2 unless the test subject has given written authorization
for the disclosure. 3 Chapter 1582 provides that test results included
in a patient's medical records do not constitute a disclosure.' Chapter
1582 also allows a person treating a patient to test the patient's blood
without written consent.5 Furthermore, Chapter 1582 permits the
disclosure of test results without written authorization to: The test
subject or the subject's legal representative, the subject's provider of
health care, 6 the provider's agents or employees who provide direct
1. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.21(k) (defimition of a disclosure).
2. Anyone who discloses test results is liable to the subject of the test for the economic,
bodily, and psychological harm proximately caused to the test subject. Id. § 199.21(d).
Violations involving a negligent disclosure shall be assessed, in addition to any criminal penalty,
a civil penalty, payable to the test subject, up to $1,000 plus court costs. Id. § 199.21(a).
Violations involving a willful disclosure shall be assessed, in addition to any criminal penalty,
a civil penalty, payable to the test subject, up to $5,000 plus court costs. Id. § 199.21(b).
3. Id. § 199.21(c). An unauthorized disclosure which results in economic, bodily, or
psychological harm to the test subject is a misdemeanor, punishable by one year in jail, a$10,000 fine, or both. Id. Each unauthorized disclosure is a separate offense. Id. § 199.21(e).
No authorization is necessary to disclose results to public health authorities or tissue banks of
tests performed on cadavers. Id. § 199.21(h). Additionally, the liability and criminal sanction
are not applicable to disclosures required by the State Department or the Centers for Disease
Control under the United States Public Health Service. Id. § 199.21(i). Id. § 199.21(g) (written
authorization, indicating to whom the disclosure may be made, is required for each separate
disclosure).
4. Id. § 199.21(1).
5. Id. § 199.22(a) (although written authorization is not required, a physician or surgeon
must obtain a patient's informed consent before testing the patient for AIDS).
6. CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.05 (definition of provider of health care). However, health care
service plans regulated under the Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act of 1975 are not
considered providers of health care for purposes of disclosing test results. CAL. HEALTH &
SA ETY CODE § 199.22(b). See id. §§ 41340-1399.63 (the Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan
Act of 1975).
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patient care and treatment, and a health care provider who uses a
body part donated pursuant to the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act.7
JF
7. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 199.24 (no written authorization is required for
disclosures under section 199.24); 7150 (Uniform Anatomical Gift Act).
Crimes; bathhouses-nuisances
Penal Code § 11225 (amended).
AB 3505 (Bradley); 1988 STAT Ch. 917.
Support: Los Angeles District Attorney's Office; Committee on
Moral Concerns
Opposition: American Civil Liberties Union; Health Officer's As-
sociation of California; Lobby for Individual Freedom and Equality
Existing law provides that places used for illegal gambling, pros-
titution, lewdness, or assignation are nuisances which must be abated,
enjoined, and prevented.' Chapter 917 makes the operation of a
bathhouse2 a nuisance if the bathhouse's primary activity encourages
or permits conduct3 which can transmit AIDS.
4
KMK
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11225. Existing law also requires health officers to take action
to prevent the spread of communicable diseases. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 3110.
2. Bathhouse means a business which, as its primary purpose, provides facilities for a
spa, whirlpool, communal bath, sauna, steam bath, mineral bath, mud bath, or facilities for
swimming. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11225(b).
3. Id. (conduct includes, but is not limited to, anal intercourse, oral copulation, or
vaginal intercourse).
4. Id. The nuisance must be enjoined and damages may be recovered. Id. See generally
City of New York v. New Saint Mark's Baths, 497 N.Y.S.2d 979, 983 (1986) (granting an
injunction to close a bathhouse as a public nuisance pursuant to state regulations aimed at
preventing the spread of AIDS); Comment, Preventing the Spread of AIDS by Restricting
Sexual Conduct in Gay Bathhouses: A Constitutional Analysis, 15 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv.
301 (1985) (analysis of constitutional attacks on bathhouses).
Selected 1988 California Legislation
Crimes
Crimes; complaint-issuance of summons
Penal Code § 816a (new); § 813 (amended).
SB 2409 (Kopp) 1988 STAT. Ch. 664
Existing law requires a magistrate' to issue an arrest warrant 2 upon
the filing of a complaint charging an offense triable in superior
court.' Chapter 664 provides that upon a request by the prosecutor,"
a magistrate must issue a summons' rather than an arrest warrant. 6
JAH
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 807 (definition of a magistrate).
2. Id. §§ 814 (form for arrest warrant); 815 (contents for arrest warrant).
3. Id. § 813 (issuance of arrest warrant).
4. The prosecutor must not request a summons if: (I) The offense involves violence,
firearms, or resisting arrest; (2) there are outstanding arrest warrants; (3) the prosecution could
be jecpardized; (4) the offense would likely continue; or (5) there is reason to believe the
defendant would not appear. Id. § 813(e).
5. A summons must be in the same form as an arrest warrant stating: (1) Name; (2)
date and time when summons was issued; (3) city or county that issued the summons; (4) the
magistrate's signature; (5) the offense; (6) a time and place to appear; (7) notification that
defendant is to complete the booking process before the first court appearance; and (8) a
provision for certification that the defendant has completed the booking process. Id. § 813(b).
6. Id. § 813. See Id. §§ 816a (the summons must be served by a peace officer or
authorized person); 813(c) (a bench warrant will be issued if the defendant does not appear,
but without proof of actual receipt of summons by defendant, the failure to appear must not
be used in any future proceedings); 813(d) (if the defendant appears without having been
booked, the court must order the completion of the booking process). Cf. Id. § 853.6 (a
defendant arrested for a misdemeanor may be released upon promise to appear).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 20
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Crimes; controlled substance analogs
Health and Safety Code §§ 11400, 11401 (new); §§ 11055, 11100,
11383 (amended).
AB 2700 (Killea); 1988 STAT. Ch. 712
(Effective August 29, 1988)*
Sponsor: Attorney General's Office
Support: County of Los Angeles; County of San Diego; City of
San Diego; California Peace Officers Association; California Ppol-
ice Chiefs Association; California State Sheriffs Association; City
of Los Angeles; San Joaquin County Board of Supervisors; Ala-
meda County Board of Supervisors; California District Attorneys
Association
Existing law makes manufacturing,' distributing, 2 or possessing
with intent to distribute imitation controlled substances3 a misde-
meanor. 4 By enacting Chapter 712, the legislature intends to prevent
the circumvention of existing controlled substance laws and the lack
of applicable criminal penalties for the analogs5 of specified controlled
substances. 6 Under Chapter 712, the identical penalties and
punishments7 apply to violations involving the analogs of specified
* Chapter 712 was made an urgency statute in response to the recent surge in the
transactions of chemicals used to manufacture a new street drug similar to methamphetimine.
1988 STAT. Ch. 712, section 6, at -.
1. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11674 (definition of manufacture).
2. Id. § 11673 (definition of distribute).
3. Id. § 11675 (definition of imitation controlled substance).
4. Id. § 11680. Distribution of imitation controlled substances to persons under eighteen
is also a misdemeanor. Id. § 11681.
5. Controlled substance analog means either: (1) A substance with a substantially similar
chemical structure to those classified in Health and Safety Code sections 11054 and 11055; or
(2) a substance that is represented to have, intended to have, or has a substantially similar
stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system as those substances
listed in Health and Safety Code sections 11054 and 11055. Id. § 11401(b). Chapter 712 does
not apply to any substance for which a new drug application has been approved, as defined
by 21 United States Code section 355 (requirements for filing and exemptions), or which is
recognized as safe for use by 21 United States Code sections 351 (adulterated drugs and
devices), 352 (misbranded drugs and devices), 353 (exemptions for drugs and devices) and 21
Code of Federal Regulations section 330-330.13 (provisions for the safety of over-the-counter
drugs). Id. § 11401(c)(1)-(2). Further, Chapter 712 does not apply to substances that qualify
for an exemption, during the pendency of the exemption, if the substance is not intended for
human consumption. Id. § 11401(c)(3).
6. Id. § 11400. Street chemists have been able to synthesize and import analogs of
controlled substances which are represented to have, intended to have, or actually have effects
similar to or greater than the regulated controlled substances as precursors or substitutes,
without applicable criminal penalties. Id. See also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11680
(regulation of imitation controlled substances). But see People v. Aston, 39 Cal. 3d 481, 494,
703 P.2d 111, 118, 216 Cal. Rptr. 771, 778 (1985) (a synthetic isomer (analog) of cocaine was
a controlled substance although not explicitly included in the cocaine statute).
7. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFTEY CODE §§ 11383(a)-(c), 11350-11356.5 (providing for felony
penalties and punishments).
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controlled substances8 and the original controlled substances 9.
ESM
8. See id. §§ 11054 (Schedule I controlled substances), 11055 (Schedule It controlled
substances); id. §§ 11100, 11383(c)(1)-(4), 11383(e), 11383(f) (list of analogs).
9. Id. § 11400. Accordingly, Chapter 712 adds N-dimetylamphetamine and N-ethylam-
phetamine their salts, isomers, and salts of isomers to Schedule II. Id. § 11055(d). Chapter
712 also adds propionic anhydride, isosafrole, safrole, piperonal, thionylchloride, benzyl
cyanide, ergonovine maleate, N-methylephedrine, N-ethylephedrine, N-methylpseudoephedrine,
N-ethylpseudoephedrine, chloroephedrine, and chloropseudoephedrine to the reporting require-
ments of Health and Safety Code section 11100. Id. § 11100(a). Chapter 712 further adds N-
methylephedrine, N-ethylephedrine, N-methylpseudoephedrine, and N-ethylpseudoephedrine to
Health and Safety Code section 11383. Id. § 11383(c),(f) (possession with intent to manufacture
and exceptions). Chapter 712 also adds that possession of the optical, positional, or geometric
isomer of any of the compounds listed equates to possession of the derivative. Id. § 11383(e).
Crimes; disrupting school activities
Education Code § 44812 (repealed); § 44811 (repealed and added).
SB 2449 (Hart); 1988 STAT. Ch. 762
Support: Moorpark Unified School District; San Diego Unified
School District; Central California Education Consortium; Jurupa
Unified School District; Kern County Superintendent of Schools;
California Association of Supervisors of Child Welfare and Atten-
dance
Under prior law, any parent, guardian, or other person' who
insulted, abused, or upbraided an on-duty public school teacher in
the presence of pupils or other school personnel was guilty of a
misdemeanor.2 However, in Ketchins v. Reiner,3 prior law was de-
termined to violate the constitutional doctrines of vagueness and
overbreadth. 4 With the enactment of Chapter 762, any parent, guard-
1. Pupils are not within the definition of other persons. In re G. R. B., 130 Cal. App.
3d 788, 790, 182 Cal. Rptr. 53, 54 (1982). The Legislature intended to protect teachers from
persons coming on to the school grounds and causing disturbances. Id. at 789, 182 Cal. Rptr.
at 53.
2. 1976 Cal. Stat. Ch. 1010, § 2, at 3411 (enacting Cal. Educ. Code § 44811 (misdemeanor
for insulting a teacher in the presence or hearing of a pupil); 1983 Cal. Stat. Ch. 1092, see.
85, at 3987 (amending Cal. Educ. Code § 44812 (misdemeanor to insult a teacher in front of'
school personnel or pupils or at a place where the teacher is required to be pursuant to school
activities).
3. 194 Cal. App. 3d 470, 239 Cal. Rptr. 549 (1987).
4. Id. at 478, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 553, 554. The court concluded that the words "insult,"
"upbraid," and "abuse" did not provide reasonably intelligent persons a guide to lawful or
unlawful behavior and were therefore unconstitutionally vague. Id. The court concluded that
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 20
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ian, or other person whose conduct materially disrupts or substan-
tially disorders classes or other school activities, is guilty of a
misdemeanor.5
BTF
the words "upbraids," "assaults," or "insults" may include constitutionally protected speech
within the ambit of the statute and therefore the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad. Id.
at 470, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 552.
5. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44811. A person may be fined no more than $100, imprisoned
in the county jail for no more than 10 days, or both. Id. This section does not apply to
picketing, distribution of handbills, or other lawful employee concerted activity. Id. But cf.
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). Petitioner's arrest and conviction for
demonstrating near school property was upheld since the Illinois statute prohibited expressive
activity if conducting expressive activity is disorderly and interrupts classes. Id. at 121.
Crimes; domestic violence-injunctions
Penal Code § 273.6 (amended).
AB 4165 (Polanco); 1988 STAT. Ch. 674
(Effective August 29, 1988)
Sponsor: Los Angeles City Attorney's Office
Support: California Commission on Status of Women; Women
Lawyers Association of Los Angeles
Under existing law, a willful and knowing violation of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) against harassment' or a protective order 2
issued under the Family Law Act,3 the Uniform Parentage Act,4 or
the Domestic Violence Prevention Act5 constitutes a misdemeanor
punishable by a fine of $1,000, imprisonment for six months, or
both. 6 Furthermore, existing law provides that a violation is punish-
1. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6(b) (definition of harassment).
2. Existing law applies to orders that: (1) Enjoin a party from molesting, attacking,
striking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, harassing, or disturbing the peace of the
other party, or other named family and household members; (2) exclude one party from the
family dwelling or the dwelling of the other; and (3) enjoin a party from specified behavior
that the court determined was necessary to effectuate other court orders. Id. § 273.6(c).
3. CA. CIV. CODE §§ 4000-5099. See id. §§ 4359, 4458, 4516 (Chapter 674 is applicable
to court orders issued under these sections).
4. Id. §§ 7000-7021. See id. §§ 7020, 7021 (Chapter 674 is applicable to court orders
issued under these sections).
5. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 540-550. See id. § 545 (Chapter 674 is applicable to
protective orders issued under this this section).
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.6 (mandating a 48-hour sentence which can not be suspended
for violations resulting in physical injury). See generally Comment, Restraining Order Legis-
lation For Battered Women: A Reassessment, 16 U.S.F. L. REv. 703 (1982) (discussing
domestic-related court orders, including procedures, sanctions, criminal remedies, problems,
and suggestions).
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able by imprisonment for up to one year if the offender has previously
been convicted of violating a TRO. 7 Chapter 674 makes a subsequent
violation punishable as a felony when the violation involves violence
or a credible threat8 of violence and occurs within seven years of a
previous and separate violation. 9
JF
7. CA. CiV. PROC. CODE § 527.6(i) (violations of this section are punishable under
Section 273.6 of the Penal Code).
8. CAL. PEa. CODE § 139(b) (definition of credible threat).
9. Id. § 273.6(d) (second and subsequent convictions for violating orders issued under
this section are punishable by imprisonment in county jail for up to one year or in state prison
for sixteen months, two years, or three years).
Crimes; driving under the influence
Vehicle Code § 23159.5 (new); §§ 13350, 13352, 13352.5, 14601.2,
14.601.3, 23161, 23170, 23175 (amended).
SB 1902 (Davis); 1988 STAT. Ch. 1415
SB 1964 (Robbins); 1988 STAT. Ch. 1453
Sponsor: Los Angeles County
Support: Mothers Against Drunk Driving; California Peace Offi-
cers Association; Committee on Moral Concerns
Under existing law, anyone who accumulates a driving history,
while their driver's license is suspended or revoked is designated a
habitual traffic offender. 2 Chapter 1415 requires a person to be
designated a habitual traffic offender if convicted of driving under
the influence of alcohol or drugs (DUI) and has two or more prior
DUI convictions in the past seven years. 3
I. CA.. VEH. CODE § 14601.3(a) (a driving history means an accumulation of three or
more violation points in a twelve month period or being involved in three or more accidents
in a twelve month period causing more than $500 in property damage, bodily injury, or death
to a pzrson). See id. § 12810 (determination of violation point counts).
2. Id. § 14601.3(a).
3. Id. § 23170 (anyone convicted of DUI who was convicted twice in the past seven
years of DUI, of a DUI resulting in bodily injury or death, or of reckless driving, or any
combination thereof must be designated a habitual traffic offender for a period of three years).
See id. §§ 23152 (prohibiting DUI); 23153 (prohibiting DUI resulting in injury or death to any
person); 23103 (prohibiting reckless driving). See id. § 23175 (for third and subsequent
convictions of these offenses in a seven year period, the offender must be designated a habitual
traffic offender for three years subsequent to the last conviction). See also id. § 13350(b) (a
convicted defendant must sign an affidavit acknowledging their license has been suspended for
DUI and the designation as a habitual traffic offender).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 20524
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Existing law prohibits anyone convicted of DUI or DUI resulting
in injury or death, from driving in violation of a suspension, revo-
cation, or restriction4 order.5 Chapter 1415 imposes on violators with
multiple DUI convictions who have been designated habitual traffic
offenders an additional $2,000 fine and imprisonment of an addi-
tional 180 days.6
Existing law assumes that a driver arrested for suspicion of DUI
has given implied consent to undergo chemical testing of blood,
breath, or urine.7 Chapter 1415 prohibits the Department of Motor
Vehicles from issuing or renewing a license unless the applicant gives
actual consent in writing s to chemical testing if requested to do so
by a peace officer. 9
Existing law authorizes restriction, suspension, or revocation of a
defendant's driving privileges upon a conviction of DUI, DUI re-
sulting in injury or death, or reckless driving. 10 With enactment of
Chapter 1453, a person must show proof of ability to respond in
damages" to receive a restricted license or to have a suspended or
revoked license reinstated.' 2 For purposes of Chapter 1453, proof of
ability to respond in damages must be maintained for three years
and failure to produce the proof if requested during that period will
result in a suspension of the defendant's license. 13
JF
4. Restrictions may limit an individual's driving privileges to commuting to work, driving
necessary for employment, and commuting to a court ordered drug or alcohol program. Id.
.§ 23161(a)(1).
5. Id. § 14601.2 (applicable to violations of Vehicle Code sections 23152 and 23153).
First offenses are punishable by a fine of $300 to $1,000 and mandatory imprisonment for
ten days to six months. Id. § 14601.2(d)(1). Subsequent offenses within five years of a prior
offense are punishable by a fine of $500 to $2,000 and imprisonment for thirty days to one
year. Id. § 14601.2(d)(2).
6. Id. § 14601.3(e)(3). The fine and imprisonment imposed by this section are in addition
to any penalty imposed for conviction of the underlying DUI offense. Id.
7. Id. § 23157. Drivers who refuse testing are subject to a fine, license revocation for
six months, and may be subject to additional revocation for up to three years with imprisonment
for certain convictions. Id. Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-765 (1966) (affirming
a DUI conviction when evidence of intoxication was obtained by extracting a blood sample
over the defendant's objections).
S. The signed declaration must state: "I agree to submit to a chemical test of my blood,
breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the alcohol or drug content of my blood when
testing is requested by a peace officer acting in accordance with Section 23157 of the Vehicle
Code." CAL. VEH. CODE § 23159.5(b).
9. Id. § 23159.5(a). The written consent requirements are applicable to all licenses issued
or renewed after January 1, 1990. Id.
10. Id. § 13352(a) (list of penalties for first and subsequent convictions).
1I. Id. § 16430 (definition of ability to respond in damages).
12. Id. § 13352(a)(l)-(7),(9).
13. Id. §§ 13352(e) (the license will remain suspended until proof of ability to respond in
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damages is reestablished); 13352.5(a), (b) (a driver must furnish proof of ability to respond in
damages if the driver's license is restricted, suspended, or revoked for violation of the terms
and conditions of probation); 23161(a)(2) (a driver must furnish proof of ability to respond
in damages if the driver's license is restricted, suspended or revoked as a condition of
probation).
Crimes; hazardous waste
Health & Safety Code § 25189.6 (new); § 25190 (amended).
AB 1983 (Margolin); 1988 STAT. Ch. 1380
Sponsor: Los Angeles District Attorney's Office
Support: Planning and Conservation League; Department of Health
Services; California Association of Highway Patrolmen; California
Department of Forestry Employees Association; California Asso-
ciation of Professional Scientists
Existing law imposes civil penalties of up to $25,000 per day on
any person' who intentionally or negligently violates the Hazardous
Waste Control Law. 2 Chapter 1380 provides that any person who
knowingly or with reckless disregard of the risk, treats,3 handles, 4
transports, or stores5 hazardous waste in a way that causes unrea-
sonable risk, 6 is guilty of a public offense, 7 punishable by a fine of
between $5,000 and $100,000 for each day of violation, or misde-
meanor or felony imprisonment, or both.8
ASA
1. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25118 (defining person to include an individual,
trust, corporation, partnership, association, city, county, state, or federal government).
2. Id. § 25189. See id. §§ 25100-25241 (Hazardous Waste Control Law), 25117 (definition
of hazardous waste).
3. Treatment means any process which changes the composition of any hazardous waste
or reduces the waste's harmful characteristics for any purpose. CAL. HEALTH & SArY CODE
§ 25123.5.
4. Handle means transporting, processing, storing, or packaging of a substance after
becoming a hazardous waste. Id. § 25116.
5. Store means to contain hazardous wastes in a manner which will not constitute
disposal or use of hazardous wastes. Id. § 25123. See id. § 25113 (disposal means to abandon,
deposit, inter, or otherwise discard waste).
6. A risk includes risk of fire, explosion, serious injury or death. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 25189.6.
7. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 15 (a crime or public offense is a commission or omission
in violation of the law which is punishable by specified penalties).
8. CAL. HEALTH & SAFErY CODE § 25189.6. Each day or partial day that a violation
continues is a separate offense. Id. The prison term is up to a year in the county jail or 16,
24, or 36 months in a state prison. Id.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 20
Crimes; hazardous waste-transportation
Health and Safety Code §§ 25115.1, 25162 (new); § 25191
(amended).
AB 3188 (Tanner); 1988 STAT. Ch. 1061
Existing law prohibits the transportation of hazardous waste' to
an unauthorized waste facility. 2 Existing law also penalizes any person
who transports hazardous waste without first obtaining a manifest3
and a valid registration from the Department of Health Services.
4
Chapter 1061, prohibits the transportation of hazardous waste to a
facility in another state or United States territory unless the facility
is: (1) Authorized to operate a hazardous waste program in accor-
dance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976;1
(2) authorized by the state, in which the facility sits, to accept
hazardous waste; and (3) not a site listed on the National Priorities
List. 6 Chapter 1061 imposes on any person who knowingly transports,
or causes the transportation of, or who reasonably should know that
another person is causing the transportation of hazardous waste by
railroad, vessel, or upon the highways of California with a final
destination of an unauthorized facility in another state.7 These same
1. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25117 (definition of hazardous waste). See id. §§
25124 (definition of waste), 25122.7 (definition of restricted hazardous waste), 25123.6 (defi-
nition of volatile organic compound).
2. Id. § 25191 (providing acts involving hazardous waste that are subject to fine or
imprisonment). See generally Peterson, Lippsett, & Collete, The Horrors of Hazardous Waste
Hauling, 60 Bus. & Soc'Y REV. 62 (1987) (the problems in transporting hazardous waste);
Comment, The Law of High-Level Nuclear Waste, 53 TENN. L. REV. 481 (1986) (analyzing
Federal statutes and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982).
3. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25160 (definition of a uniform hazardous waste
manifest).
4. Id. §§ 25160 (hazardous waste manifest required); 25163 (necessary registration required
for transporting hazardous waste). See generally Overcast & Dively, Options for Gathering
Information About Shipments of Radioactive and Other Hazardous Materials, 53 TENN. L.
REV. 559 (1986) (analyzing alternatives for hazardous materials).
5. 42 U.S.C. 6901. The authorization must be by the Environmental Protection Agency
or the state where the facility is sited and the facility must have an operating permit, research
permit or have been granted interim status under the federal Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25162(a). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6925(c) (rules for
the issuance of a permit), 6925(e) (interim status requirements), and 6926(a) (requirements for
state authorized hazardous waste programs).
6. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25162 (a)-(b). See 42 U.S.C. § 9605(8)(B) The
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 definition
of the National Priority List which names the 100 highest priority facilities for clean-up. Id.
7. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25162 (providing that it is illegal to transport
hazardous waste in California that has as a final destination an unauthorized facility), 25191(a)
(perscribing penalties for violating Health and Safety Code section 25162), 25162(8)(b) (the
penalties must be imposed on the owner or lessee of the vehicle that transported the hazardous
waste or on the person who authorized the transportation of the waste); § 25919(a) Violations
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penalties apply to any person who knowingly delivers or arranges
delivery of hazardous waste to another person for transportation to
an unauthorized facility in another state or territory.' Finally, Chapter
1061 prohibits the transportation9 of hazardous waste to a foreign
country, unless the foreign country has consented in writing to the
shipment' or the shipment is part of an international agreement."
JAH
are punishable by a fine between $2,000 and $25,000 for each day of the violation, by
imprisonment in the county jail, or by both.
8. Id. § 25162(d).
9. See id. § 25150.2 (adoption of regulations for the shipment of hazardous waste acro,.s
international boundaries).
IC. Id. § 25162(e)(1) (a copy of the written consent, or a copy of the EPA Acknowl-
edgement of Consent must be attached to the manifest).
11. Id. § 25162(e). Id. § 25191(a) (violators may be punished by a fine between $2,000
and $25,000, imprisonment for not more than one year, or both). See id. §§ 25115.1(e) (no
person shall knowingly deliver hazardous waste to another person who will transport to a
foreign country); 25162(e)(2) (the agreement must comply with the provisions of Title 42
section 6938(0 of the United States Code). See also 42 U.S.C. § 6938(f) (after November
1984, any person exporting hazardous waste must file a report summarizing the types, quantity,
frequency and ultimate destination of the waste). See generally Comment, The United States
Environmental Protection Agency's Proposal for At-Sea Incineration of Hazardous Waste-A
Transnational Perspective, 21 VAND. L.J. OF TRAN NAT'L LAW 157 (1988) (how the United
State's disposal of 264 million metric tons of hazardous waste per year will affect other
nations).
Crimes; interfering with hunters
Fish and Game Code § 2009 (new).
AB 3156 (Allen); 1988 STAT. Ch. 1278
Under existing law, ownership of wild animals can arise in private
persons.' Chapter 1278 makes willful interference' with a person
1. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 656 (wild animals are subject to ownership only when: (1) Present
on the land of a person claiming them; (2) tamed; (3) taken and held in possession; or (4)
disabled and immediately pursued); CAL. FISH & GAM CODE § 2011 (taking another's bird or
mammal that has been reduced to possession, wounded, or maimed and the person who
causing the injury is in hot pursuit is a misdemeanor). See also CAL. FisH & GAMfE CODE §
2014 (the state may recover civil damages for the unlawful or negligent taking or destroying
of any bird, mammal, fish, reptile, or amphibian protected by law). See generally E. parte
Phoedovious, 170 P. 412, 414, 177 Cal. 238, 243 (1918) (private ownership of game is a
qualified right subject to reasonable legislative regulation).
2. See CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2009(f) (acts that physically impede, hinder, or obstruct
the activity, including frightening away the animals). Chapter 1278 also requires specific intent
to interfere. Id. § 2009(e). But see Dorman v. Satti, 678 F.Supp. 375, 383-384 (1986)
(Connecticut's Hunter Harassment Act violated vagueness and overbreadth doctrines by po-
tentially including areas of protected speech in the definition of interference with persons
lawfully engaged in acts in preparation or taking of wildlife).
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lawfully' hunting, fishing, trapping, or engaged in falconry an in-
fraction. 4 The penalty for a second conviction within two years of
another convicton is a misdemeanor. 5
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3. See CAL. FISH & GAm CODE § 2000 (any taking must be according to appropriate
regulations and a rebuttable presumption of a taking arises when in possession of any bird,
mammal, fish, reptile, or parts). See also CAL. CODE OF RGs. tit. 14, § 243 (1945) (circum-
stances for lawfully taking fish, frogs, and invertebrates). See generally Guaranty Realty Co.
v. Recreation Gun Club, 107 P. 625 (1910) (recognizing a property interest in an exclusive
right to hunt on a game preserve and allowing injunctive relief for interference with that
right).
4. CAL. FISH & Gum CODE § 2009. See id. § 2009(b) (imposing a fine between $100
and $500 for a violation). Chapter 1278 does not apply to peace officers or fish and game
personnel in the performance of their duties and does not hinder the rights of landowners or
their tenants to farm, ranch or prevent trespass. Id. § 2009(d).
5. Id. § 2009(c) (imposing a fine between $100 and $1000, imprisonment in the county
jail for not more than one year, or both).
Crimes; Juvenile Drug Trafficking and Schoolyard Act of
1988
Health and Safety Code § 11353.6 (new).
AB 3451 (O'Connell); 1988 STAT. Ch. 1248
Existing law provides for a prison term of three, five, or seven
years to any person eighteen years old or older who: (1) Solicits or
intimidates a minor to violate a statute regarding specified controlled
substances;' (2) uses a minor to unlawfully transport or sell those
controlled substances;2 (3) uses a minor as an agent;3 or (4) furnishes
a controlled substance to a minor. 4 Under existing law, an adult who
gives' a controlled substance to a minor under fourteen years old
upon school grounds6 is punishable by five, seven, or nine years in
1. Applicable controlled substances are listed in Health and Safety Code sections 11054
with the exception of marijuana (Schedule I drugs), 11055 (Schedule II drugs), 11056 (Schedule
III drugs), 11057 (Schedule IV drugs), 11058 (Schedule V drugs). CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 11353, 11380, 11380.5.
2. Id. § 11353.
3. Id. §§ 11380, 11380.5.
4. Id. §§ 11353, 11380, 11380.5. See generally B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES, Dealings
with Minor § 700 (1985 Supp.) (providing overview of drug related offenses involving minors).
5. CAL. HEALTH & SAFErY CODE § 11353.5 (or selling or preparing to sell).
6. Id. § 11353.5 (applies to schools providing instruction for kindergarten or grades one
through twelve inclusive; the violation must occur during the hours the school or playground
is open for school or school related activities).
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prison.7 Chapter 1248, the Juvenile Drug Trafficking and Schoolyard
Act of 1988,8 provides a sentence enhancement of three, four, or
five years for a person convicted of possessing, 9 transporting,," sell-
ing," or manufacturingI2 cocaine base if the offense occurs within
1,000 feet of a school. 3 Chapter 1248 permits an additional enhance-
ment of three, four, or five years if the defendant is over eighteen
years old and the offense involves a minor at least four years younger
than the defendant.14 The terms are imposed in addition to any other
punishment;'5 however, they are imposed at the court's discretion
and may be struck by the court if there are mitigating factors.' 6
ASA
7. Id. See id. §§ 11054(f)(1), 11351.5, 11352, 11379.6 (possession, transportation, or sale
of cocaine base is punishable by three, four, or five years in prison, manufacture of cocaine
base is punishable by three, five, or seven years in prison). See also id. § 11054(f)(1) (definition
of cocaine includes any compound, mixture, or preparation which contains cocaine base or
cocaine isomers).
8. Id. § 11353.6(a).
9. Id. § 11351.5.
10. Id. § 11352.
11. Id.
12. Id. § 11379.6.
13. Id. § 11353.6(b) (also included is a conspiracy to commit any above offense). A
school includes any public or private elementary, vocational, junior high, or high school. Id.
14. Id. § 11353.6(c). The allegations relating to age and schools must be charged in the
pleadings and either admitted or found to be true. Id. § 11353.6(d). See People v. Montalvo,
4 Cal. 3d 328, 334, 482 P.2d 205, 210, 93 Cal. Rptr. 581, 586 (1971) (prosecution has burden
of proving defendant's majority if it is an element of the crime), and People v. Hernandez,
61 Cal. 2d 529, 536, 393 P.2d 673, 677, 93 Cal. Rptr. 361, 365 (1964) (a reasonable belief
that the victim was over eighteen is a defense).
15. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11353.6(e).
16. Id. § 11353.6(b),(c),(f).
Crimes; petty theft-prior conviction
Penal Code § 666 (amended).
SB 2377 (Mello); 1988 STAT. Ch. 831
Under existing law, any person convicted of petty theft' is subject
to imprisonment in the county jail for a period not exceeding six
months, a fine not exceeding $1,000, or both.2 In addition, every
person convicted of petty theft who was previously convicted and
I. CAL. PENAL CODE § 488 (definition of petty theft).
2. Id. § 490.
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imprisoned for petty theft, grand theft,3 burglary, 4 robbery, 5 or auto
theft6 may be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for a
period not exceeding one year or in the state prison. 7 Chapter 831
adds a felony violation of receiving or concealing stolen property to
this list of prior offenses for which a subsequent petty theft conviction
results in imprisonment. 8
JAH
3. Id. §§ 487 (definition of grand theft); 487a, 487b, 487d, 487e, 487g (specific crimes
constituting grand theft).
4. Id. § 459 (definition of burglary).
5. Id. § 211 (definition of robbery).
6. CAL. VEH. CODE § 10851(a)-(b) (definition of theft of a vehicle).
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 666. See id. § 17(a) (a felony is punishable by state imprisonment).
See also People v. Valenzuela, 116 Cal. App. 3d 798, 809, 172 Cal. Rptr. 284, 289 (1981) (a
person arrested for petty theft, booked and immediately released, is considered to have served
a day in a penal institution and comes within Penal Code section 666); People v. Beaty, 84
Cal. App. 3d 239, 242, 148 Cal. Rptr. 319, 321 (1978) (felony punishment for a person
convicted of petty theft with a prior offense is not cruel and unusual punishment); People v.
Perry, 204 Cal. App. 2d 201, 204, 22 Cal. Rptr. 54, 55-56 (1962) (a prior conviction in a
foreign state may be considered).
8. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 666 (the previous offense may be either a misdemeanor or a
felony), 496 (defining receiving stolen property and penalties). See People v. Ancira, 164 Cal.
App. 3d 378, 381, 210 Cal. Rptr. 527, 528, (1985) (there is no mandatory requirement that
the prior conviction be proven in open court since the prior conviction can be treated as a
misdemeanor or a felony). See generally Review of Selected 1977 California Legislation, 9
PAC. L.J. 281, 490 (1978) (examination of existing law which requires increased punishment
for prior theft convictions).
Crimes; possession of plastic firearm
Penal Code § 12020 (amended).
AB 4546 (Roos); 1988 STAT. Ch. 1191
Existing law provides that any person in California who: (1)
Manufactures or causes proscribed weapons to be manufactured; (2)
imports the weapons into the state; (3) keeps, offers or exposes the
weapons for sale; or (4) gives, lends or possess the weapons is guilty
of a felony.' Chapter 1191 includes plastic firearms2 in this list of
proscribed weapons.' Additionally, Chapter 1191 requires all new
I. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12020. See also Matter of Stephen L., 162 Cal. App. 3d 257,
259, 208 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1984) (minor charged with possession of unlawfully carrying a
concealed dirk and dagger).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12020(d)(9) (definition of a plastic firearm).
3. Id. § 12020(a).
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firearm detection equipment installed in nonfederal buildings in Cal-
ifornia to meet federally approved detectability standards.
4
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4. Id. § 12020(d)(10) (all firearm detection equipment newly installed in nonfederal public
buildings must be approved by the United States Attorney General, the Secretary of Trans-
portation, or the Secretary of Treasury as constituting adequate state of the art equipment for
detecting a plastic firearm and which also can differentiate harmless metal objects).
Crimes; Proposition 67, murder-killing of peace officers
Penal Code §§ 190, 2933 (amended).
SB 402 (Proposition 67) (Presley); 1987 STAT. Ch. 1006
(effective June 7, 1988 by voter initiative)
SB 1265 (Presley); 1988 STAT. Ch. 121
(effective June 7, 1988)
Existing law specifies that punishment for second degree murder
is a prison term from fifteen years to life.' Proposition 67 increases
the punishment for the second degree murder of peace officers 2 killed
in the performance of their duties to twenty-five years to life if the
murderer knew or reasonably should have known that the peace
officer was acting in the performance of his duties.'
Existing law allows certain inmates to earn good behavior and
participation time credits, 4 and worktime credits' on sentences to
reduce the time served in prison.6 Under Chapter 121, inmates
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190(a). Second degree murders are all murders not in the first
degree. Id. § 189. A murder is in the first degree if accomplished by: (1) Means of a destructive
devic. or explosive; (2) knowing use of ammunition designed primarily to penetrate metal or
armor; (3) poison; (4) lying in wait; (5) torture; (6) any other kind of willful, deliberate, and
premeditated killing; or (7) a murder during the attempt or commission of arson, rape, robbery,
mayhem, burglary, or during lewd or lascivious acts with a child under age fourteen. Id.
2. Peace officer means: (1) Police, marshals, sheriffs, constables, or inspectors or
investigators employed by the district attorney; (2) highway patrol person; (3) state police; or
(4) correctional, probation, and parole officers. Id. § 190(b).
3. Id.
4. Id. § 2931 (prisoners sentenced pursuant to Penal Code section 1170 are eligible for
a reduction of one-third for good behavior and participation). Section 2931 does not apply to
any person whose crime was committed on or after January 1, 1983. Id. § 2931(d).
5. Id. § 2933 (requirements for earning worktime credit privilege, amount, forfeiture,
restoration, and review).
6. Id. §§ 2931, 2933. See id. § 2931 (sentence reduction requirements for good behavior
and work-time credits and conditions for sentence modification to all felonies sentenced after
July 1, 1977). See also id. § 2932 (grounds for denial of time credits); 15 CAL. CODE o0 REGO.
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convicted of murder in the first degree can earn only good behavior
and participation time credits for sentence reductions.7
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8 2120 (1979) (denial of good time credits). See generally In re Monigold, 139 Cal. App. 3d
485, 188 Cal. Rptr. 698 (1983) (explaining different methods of providing credit for prison
conduct for determinate and indeterminate sentencing and holding that conduct credits apply
to a two-year enhancement but not to a fifteen-year to life sentence); People v. Sampsell, 34
Cal. 2d 757, 764, 214 P.2d 813, 818 (1950) (conduct credits do not apply to minimum life
sentences); 70 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 49 (1987) (state prisoners serving sentences of 15 years to
life, 25 years to life, and life without the possibility of parole are not eligible for worktime
credits and therefore minimum terms of life sentences for murder are not reduced more than
one-third by good behavior and participation credits).
7. CA. PENAL CODE § 2933(e). Inmates sentenced under section 190(b) are not eligible
for good behavior or participation credits. Id. § 190(b) (as amended by Proposition 67, section
I of voter initiative June 7, 1988). The legislature, however, expresses no opinion as to whether
the amendment effects existing law. 1988 STAT. ch. 121 sec. 2, at
Crimes; prosecuting witnesses
Penal Code §§ 288, 868.5 (amended).
AB 3835 (N. Waters); 1988 STAT. Ch. 1398
AB 4208 (Roybal-Allard); 1988 STAT. Ch. 1449
Under existing law, the commission of a lewd or lascivious act
upon' a child under fourteen years of age is a felony. 3 Chapter 1398
I. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(a) (with or upon the body of a child or any part or member
of the child's body).
2. If the victim is fourteen years of age or older, the offender may be charged with
other crimes under appropriate circumstances. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 243.4 (sexual battery);
261 (rape); 261.5 (unlawful sexual intercourse); 285 (incest); 286 (sodomy); 288a (oral copu-
lation); 289 (penetration by foreign object). See also People v. Dudley, 53 Cal. App. 2d 181,
185, 127 P.2d 569, 570 (1942) (conviction under Penal Code section 288 was overturned
because the acts were committed on day preceding child's fourteenth birthday).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(a). The lewd or lascivious act must be committed with the
intent to arouse, appeal to, or gratify the lust or sexual desires or passions of the child or the
perpetrator. Id. The offense is punishable by three, six, or eight years imprisonment. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 288(a). See People v. Meacham, 152 Cal. App. 3d 142, 156, 199 Cal. Rptr.
586, 595 (1984) (intent may be shown by circumstantial evidence and found in the circumstances
connected with the offense); People v. Gutierrez, 80 Cal. App. 3d 829, 835-36, 145 Cal. Rptr.
823, 827 (1978) (defendant's good faith reasonable belief that victim was age fourteen or older
is defense to Penal Code section 288 charge). See generally Von Schlichting, Lewd or Lascivious
Acts with a Child Under Fourteen: California's Extension of Force Under Penal Code Section
288, 9 Craut. JusT. J. 119 (1986) (overview of the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct with
a child under fourteen years of age); I B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMs §§ 545-549 (1963 &
Supp. 1983) (discussion of the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child under fourteen
years of age).
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provides that one who is at least ten years older than the child and
who willfully and lewdly commits a lewd or lascivious act on a
fourteen or fifteen year old child is guilty of a misdemeanor or
felony.4
Existing law allows a prosecuting witness' sixteen years of age or
younger, in prosecutions 6 for specified sex offenses, 7 to have up to
two family members in attendances for support during testimony.9
Chapter 1449 authorizes a prosecuting witness of any age, in prose-
cutions of specified sex offenses,10 to choose two family members
for support during testimony." In addition, Chapter 1449 specifies
that the court is not precluded from removing a support witness for
prompting, swaying, or influencing the prosecuting witness.'
2
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4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(c) (punishable by no longer than one year in county jail or
one, two, or three years in state prison).
5. See People v. Kabonic, 177 Cal. App. 3d 487, 494-496, 223 Cal. Rptr. 41, 45-46
("prosecuting witness" includes all witnesses for the prosecution, not just victims or complain-
ants).
6. CAL. PEa. CODE § 868.5(a) (including preliminary hearings, trials, and juvenile court
proceedings).
7. Id. Under California Penal Code section 868.5(a), specified sex offenses include
violations of: California Penal Code sections 243.4 (sexual battery), 261 (rape), 273(a) (willful
cruelty or unjustifiable punishment of a child), 273(d) (corporal punishment or injury of a
child), 285 (incest), 286 (sodomy), 288 (lewd or lascivious acts with a child under age fourteen),
288a (oral copulation), 289 (penetration of genital or anal openings by a foreign object), 647.6
(annoying or molesting a child under eighteen), and section 314(1) (exposing one's person or
private parts). Id.
8. Id. § 868.5(a) (additionally providing that one of the family members may be a witness
and may accompany the prosecuting witness to the stand at the preliminary hearing, trial, and
juvenile court proceeding for support).
9. Id. (includes the preliminary hearing, trial, and juvenile court proceeding).
10. See CAL. PENAL. CODE §§ 243.4 (sexual battery), 261 (rape), 273(a) (willful cruelty or
unjustifiable punishment of a child), 273(d) (corporal punishment or injury of a child), 2M5
(incest), 286 (sodomy), 288 (lewd or lascivious acts on a child), 288a (oral copulation), 2&9
(penetration of genital or anal openings with a foreign object), 647.6 (annoying or molesting
a child under eighteen), 314(1) (indecent exposure).
11. CAL. PENAl. CODE § 868.5(a) Only one support person may accompany the prosecuting
witness to the stand, but the other may remain in the courtroom during the testimony of the
witness. Id. Support persons who are newspeople immune from citation for contempt of court
pursuant to Evidence Code section 1070, must be a parent, guardian or sibling of the witness
and may not take notes during the hearing or proceeding. Id.
12. Id. § 868.5(b). Previously, section 868.5(b) indicated that the judge could only instruct
the support persons not to prompt, sway, or influence the witness in any way. 1987 Cal. STAT.
ch. 1418, sec. 6.5, at -(amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 868.5(b)). However, former section
868.5(b) did not directly limit the powers of the court to remove the support persons. Id.
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Crimes; restitution-enforcement of judgment
Penal Code § 1214 (amended).
SB 2837 (Seymour); 1988 STAT. Ch. 662
Existing law requires a court to order any person convicted of a
crime to pay, in addition to any other fine or penalty, a restitution
fine' which is enforceable as a money judgment. 2 Chapter 662 pro-
hibits enforcing as a money judgment, a restitution fine imposed as
a condition of probation or of a conditional sentence unless the
defendant was advised of the right to have a court determine the
amount of restitution and the .defendant either: (1) Was given a
hearing; (2) waived a hearing; or (3) stipulated to the amount of
restitution included in the judgment. 3 Under Chapter 662, an order
to pay restitution directly to a victim constitutes a civil judgment
enforceable4 by the victim.5
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1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1464 (calculation of amount of restitution fine).
2. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 13967 (restitution fines may be payable to the Restitution Fund
and enforceable by the state, or payable directly to the defendant's victim and enforceable by
the victim). See id. § 13960.1 (definition of Restitution Fund).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1214. See County of Ventura v. Tillett, 133 Cal. App. 3d 105,
113, 183 Cal. Rptr. 741, 746 (1982) (a confession of judgment is constitutional only if the
defendant waived due process rights knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily). See also Isbell
v. County of Sonoma, 21 Cal. 3d 61, 64, 577 P.2d 188, 189, 145 Cal. Rptr. 368, 369 (1978)
(confession of judgment requires the defendant to either have had an opportunity to be heard
or to voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive that right).
4. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 695.010 (enforcement of judgments).
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1214 (if the court orders a defendant to pay restitution directly
to a victim, the victim is the judgment creditor and the court must provide the victim with a
certified copy of the order upon request). See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 680.240 (definition of
judgment creditor). See generally Harland, Monetary Remedies for the Victims of Crime:
Assessing the Role of the Criminal Courts, 30 UCLA L. REv. 52 (1982) (discussion of
restitution as a criminal sanction).
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Crimes; sewers and sewer systems-harmful substances
Penal Code § 374.2 (new).
SB 2396 (Boatwright); 1988 STAT. Ch. 1057
Existing law forbids the disposal of hazardous waste at unauthor-
ized sites.' Chapter 1057 prohibits any person2 from maliciously3
depositing 4 without written authorization, a substance capable of
causing substantial damage or harm to the public sanitary sewer
system, or commercial quantities5 of any other substance, into a
manhole, cleanout, or other facility that is connected to a public
sanitary sewer system not intended for deposit. 6 A violation of
Chapter 1057 is either a misdemeanor or felony depending upon past
violations.7
SD W
1. CAL. HEALTH & SArTY CODE § 25242.
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 374.2(b) (a person includes an individual, trust, firm, partnership,
joint stock company, or corporation).
3. Id. § 374.2(a) (malicious means an intent to do a wrongful act).
4. Id. (deposit means to discharge, dump, release, place, drop, pour, or otherwise
deposit).
5. Any substance deposited or discharged in any amount greater than for normal domestic
sewer use. Id. § 374.2(b).
6. Id. § 374.2(a). Lack of knowledge that the manhole or cleanout is connected to a
public sewer system is not a defense. Id. § 374.2(c).
7. Id. § 374.2(d). The first offense is punishable by imprisonment for not more than
one year, a fine up to $25,000, or both. Second and subsequent offenses are punishable by a
term of 16, 20, or 24 months in the state prison and a fine of not less that $5,000 or more
than $25,000. Id. Chapter 1057 does not alter, preempt, or diminish the application of other
federal and state laws concerning the discharge or release of hazardous waste. 1988 Cal. Stat.
ch. 1057, sec. 2, at . Chapter 1057 does not create nor enlarge any defense in an action
to enforce those penalties. Id.
Crimes; sex offenses-AIDS testing
Penal Code §§ 647f, 1202.1, 1202.6, 12022.85 (new).
SB 1007 (Doolittle); 1988 STAT. Ch. 1597
Existing law forbids the testing of a person's blood for evidence
of antibodies to the probable causative agent of Aquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) without written consent.' Chapter 1597
1. CAL. HALmTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 199.20, 199.22 (civil penalties are imposed for
disclosure of the results of blood tests without consent).
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requires a blood test of any person convicted of prostitution, 2 rape,3
unlawful intercourse with a female under age eighteen, 4 rape of a
spouse,' forcible sodomy, 6 or forcible oral copulation (collectively
referred to as "sex offenses").8 Chapter 1597 requires the county
probation officer to develop test procedures for the testing of pros-
titutes, but Chapter 1597 does not address the testing of the sex
offenders.9 The person tested must be notified of the test results. 10
The county probation officer must provide test results of convicted
prostitutes to the sentencing court, county health officer and the
Department of Health." The Department of Justice must provide the
test results of convicted sex offenders to defense and prosecution
attorneys in subsequent prosecutions.12 If, as part of a previous
conviction, a defendant was informed of a positive test result and is
subsequently convicted for a violation of prostitution or forcible
2. See id. § 647(b) (definition of prostitution). Prostitution is a misdemeanor. Id. §§ 17,
647(b).
3. See id § 261 (definition of rape). Rape is a felony. Id. § 264.
4. Id. § 261.5 (unlawful sexual intercourse with a female under age 18 is prohibited).
Unlawful sexual intercourse with a female under age 18 is a felony. Id. §§ 17, 264.
S. Id. § 262 (a rape of a spouse is prohibited). Rape of a spouse is a felony. Id. §§ 17,
264.
6. Id. § 286 (a definition of sodomy offenses). Forcible sodomy is a misdemeanor. Id.
§§ 17, 286.
7. Id. § 288a (definition of oral copulation offenses). Forcible oral copulation is a
misdemeanor. Id. §§ 17, 288a.
8. Id. §§ 1202.1(a) (every person convicted of one of the sex offenses must submit to
AIDS testing), 1202.6 (every person convicted of a violation of a prostitution offense must
submit to AIDS testing). For a second or subsequent conviction for prostitution, Chapter 1597
permits a court, before sentencing, to order the defendant to submit to a blood test. Id. §
1202.6(b). The county health officer must select an agency to provide AIDS education to
prostitutes and drug users; if no agency exists, the county health officer must develop an
education program. Id. § 1202.6(d). The county health officer must forward a list of agencies
selected for referrals. Id. The county health officer must provide victims of persons convicted
of any of the sex offenses pre-test and post-test counseling. 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 1597, sec. 5,
at
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.6(e) (for violations of prostitution offenses, the county
probation officer, in consultation with the county health officer, must establish procedures for
testing the defendant for evidence of antibodies to the probable causative agent of AIDS
before sentencing or probation); 1202.1(a) (for violations of the sex offenses a blood test for
evidence of antibodies to the probable causative agent of AIDS is required whether the person
will be sentenced, fined, or put on probation).
10. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1202.1(a) (a defendant must be informed of the test results
when convicted of a rape offense, forcible sodomy, or forcible oral copulation), 1202.6(c) (a
defendant convicted of a prostitution violation must be informed and given a copy of the test
results at the sentencing hearing). The record must reflect that the defendant received a copy
of the report, and the defendant was made aware of the ramifications of a positive test. Id.
§ 1202.6(c).
11. Id. § 1202.6(g). The Department of Health must furnish copies of the reports to a
district attorney upon request. Id.
12. Id. § 1202.1(c). The Department of Justice must provide the test results of people
under investigation or being prosecuted for a subsequent offense under Penal Code sections
647(f) or 12022.85 to the prosecuting attorney for the sole purpose of preparing counts for a
subsequent offense under section 647(0 and, if requested, to the defense attorney. Id.
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sodomy or forcible oral copulation, the defendant is guilty of a
felony. 3 If the defendant is found guilty of a second or subsequent
conviction for a sex offense,1 4 and the defendant knew that she had
AIDS or carried the human immunodeficiency virus at the time of
the commission of the second or subsequent offense, the defendant
will be subject to a three year sentence enhancement for each vio-
lation. 5
COMMENT
Under existing law, the state may not conduct a search that involves
a bodily intrusion without probable cause 6 to believe the intrusion
will reveal evidence of a crime.' 7 The Supreme Court has carved out
a careful exception to this constitutional requirement when the search
can be characterized as an administrative search to enforce regula-
tions. A conflict exists, however, between the circuits over whether
an administrative search without probable cause may be extended to
searches involving bodily fluids.'"
13. Id. § 647(f).
14. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.85(b) (list of offenses).
15. Id. § 12022.85(a). The test result from the prior conviction may be used to show
knowledge. Id. 12022.85(c).
16. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236-237 (1983) (probable cause means a substantial
basis for concluding that a search will uncover evidence of wrongdoing).
17. U.S. CONsr. amend. IV; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13 (right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures). See People v. Browning, 108 Cal. App. 3d 117, 125, 166 Cal. Rptr,
293, 297 (1980) (warrant for bodily intrusion requires probable cause to believe intrusion will
reveal evidence of a crime). See also People v. Scott, 21 Cal. 3d 284, 578 P.2d 123, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 876 (1978). After probable cause is found for a bodily search, the issuing authority must
apply an additional balancing test to determine whether the character of the requested search
is appropriate. Id. at 293, 578 P.2d. at 127, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 880. Factors for consideration
include: (1) Reliability of the method to be employed; (2) seriousness of underlying criminal
offense; (3) society's interest in obtaining conviction; (4) strength of law enforcement officer's
suspicions that evidence of crimes will be revealed; (5) importance of evidence sought; and (6)
possibility that evidence may be recovered by alternative means less violative of Fourth
Amendment freedoms. Id. The intrusion must be balanced against the severity of the proposed
intrusion. Id. See also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). The withdrawing of
blood to determine alcoholic content in connection with an arrest for driving under the
influence constitutes a search of a person, but a warrant was not required due to exigent
circumstance that evidence would dissipate with delay. Id. at 768. A search is not allowed on
the mere chance that evidence will be obtained. Id. at 769-70. But see In re Clemente, 61 Cal.
App. 666, 667, 215 P. 698 (1923) (for quarantine purposes, the government was permitted to
presume a prostitute had venereal disease on the basis of her profession and the fact she was
connected with a house in which the disease had been present).
18. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987).
cert. granted U.S. (19 ). The court upheld compulsory urinalysis as a condition for requests
to transfer to other positions in the federal customs service. Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 178, 181.
The court balanced the important governmental need for drug free customs employees against
the intrusiveness of the test. Id. at 176-77. Critical to the court's analysis was that the testing
procedure ensured accurate results and the employee could withdraw from the application
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An inspection of a home for discovery of safety code violations
has been held to be an administrative search.' 9 The Supreme Court
in Camara v. Municipal Court2° stated that the inspection of a home
with an administrative warrant, but without probable cause would
be reasonable when the search was carried out under an administrative
scheme for detecting safety code violations.21 In determining that the
search would be reasonable, courts must weigh the public interest in
the prevention of unsafe conditions against the degree of intrusion
the search would entail. 22 In New York v. Burger,23 the Court
extended the administrative search rationale to an automobile dis-
mantling business where the search was done by police without an
administrative warrant but one of the purposes of the search was to
discover evidence of a crime.24 The Court weighed the business
owner's expectation of privacy against the government's need for a
warrantless inspection, and concluded that the statutory scheme was
so specific that the scheme was constitutionally adequate as a sub-
stitute for a warrant.25 Chapter 1597 allows three different types of
searches.2 6 The first is a search of a convicted prostitute's blood for
the purposes of: (1) Determining if the person has AIDS; (2) building
process rather than submit to a test. Id. at 178-181. See also Railway Labor Executives Ass'n
v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted U.S. (19). The court refused to extend
the administrative search rationale to a search of a person's body without particularized
suspicion that the search would turn up evidence of a crime. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 587. Both
cases involve testing of employees of heavily regulated industries or governmental functions
that involve the public health and safety. Von Raab at 173; Burnley at 577-578.
19. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
20. Id.
21. See id. An administrative warrant is issued if there are reasonable administrative
standards governing the selection of subjects for inspection, such as the passage of time or
the nature of the building, rather than specific knowledge of the condition of the particular
building. Id. at 538. The administrative warrant would serve to limit the discretion of the
inspecting official. Id. at 532-33.
22. See id. at 536-37 (the intrusion was slight since the inspection was not personal nor
aimed at the discovery of evidence of a crime).
23. 107 S. Ct. 2636 (1987).
24. Id. at 2649. The dual purpose of the search, regulation and criminal enforcement,
did not invalidate the fact that the search was pursuant to a legislative scheme aimed at
regulation. Id.
25. Id. at 2646. The specific factors important to the Court were: (1) A substantial
government interest existed because of the rapidly increasing volume of thefts; (2) warrantless
inspections were necessary to further the regulatory scheme because stolen parts often pass
quickly through junkyards; (3) the statutory inspection scheme served to advise the business
owner of the scope and frequency of the inspections, as well as those authorized to conduct
them; and (4) the permitted inspection was carefully limited in time, place and scope. Id. at
2646. The business owner had a reduced expectation of privacy because of the extensive
regulation of that industry. Id.
26. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1202.6(a) (search of blood in connection with conviction of first
prostitution offense), 1202.6(b) (search of blood in connection with second prostitution offense),
1202.1(a) (search of blood in connection with conviction of sex offense).
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a record; and (3) informing the person of an infection and the
consequences of a subsequent conviction. 27 After a subsequent con-
viction the prostitute will be tested again, and the second search may
be used only for the purposes of sentence enhancement .2  The third
type of search is the test required for a sex offender.29 As opposed
to the convicted prostitute, the sex offender will be tested only once,
after the initial conviction, to build a record, inform the sex offender
of infection, and use that test result to charge the person with a
more serious crime for a subsequent conviction. 3
The governmental interest and the privacy intrusion vary with the
different testing purposes. 3' The government's need to identify pros-
titutes who may continue to ply their trade with knowledge that they
are infected with AIDS, along with the fact that AIDS carriers are
overtly symptomless until they reach an advanced stage, may offset
the expectation of privacy for a prostitute or sex offender.32 The
inaccuracy in AIDS tests, combined with the great discretion Chapter
1597 leaves to counties in selecting the type of test, and Chapter
1597's failure to address the AIDS problem from a regulatory stand-
point may tip the balance more in the individual's favor.3 Further-
more, the single search of the sex offender's blood with the dual
purpose to build a record and punish may be hard to characterize
as administrative, since the search for evidence to convict of a crime
is more intrusive than the search of a business pursuant to a regu-
latory scheme. 4 While the second test of the prostitute is supported
by probable cause from the positive results of the first test, the
second search may be unreasonable because the evidence is already
on record.35
27. Id. §§ 1202.1(a), 1202.6(a).
28. Id. § 1202.6(b).
29. Id. § 1202.1(a).
30. Id.
31. Compare Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967) (search for regulatory
purposes by administrative personnel) with New York v. Burger, 107 S. Ct. 2636, 2649-51
(1987) (police search for regulatory and penal purposes).
32. See generally Sullivan & Fields, AIDS and the Coercive Power of the State, 23 HART
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 139, 140 (1988).
33. Compare 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 1597, sees. 1-3, at - (no regulatory scheme indicated)
with Burger, 107 S. Ct. at 2646-48 (regulatory scheme reflected in legislation). See generally
Banks & McFadden, Rush to Judgment: HIV Test Reliability and Screening, 23 TULSA L.J. 1
(general discussion of the predictive value of the various tests for AIDS).
34. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 530 (the search is not personal nor aimed at discovery of
evidence of a crime). See also, Burger, 107 S. Ct. at 2649-51 (the business was part of a
heavily regulated industry).
35. See People v. Scott, 21 Cal. 3d 284, 295, 578 P.2d 123, 128, 145 Cal. Rptr. 876, 881
(1978). Even when there is probable cause to suspect evidence of a crime, as in the case of a
prostitute with a prior positive test result, the second test will not be allowed when the evidence
is not needed. Id.
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In addition to prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, the
federal and state constitutions prohibit criminal statutes that submit
a defendant to unfair procedures or allow arbitrary enforcement of
vague statutes.16 AIDS tests that have been designed to screen blood
only, and not to provide evidence for the imposition of criminal
sanctions, are purposefully oversensitive and the results often show
false-positives.3 7 Such tests submit a defendant to unfair procedures.
Furthermore, Chapter 1597, by not limiting or defining the test that
may be used, creates the potential for individual counties to apply
different and inadequate testing procedures resulting in false-positives
and inconsistent convictions.3 s The requirements are unnecessarily
vague.
Finally, the California Constitution recognizes a fundamental right
to privacy. 39 The right is limited and the state may intrude in order
to further a compelling state interest. 40 Although Chapter 1597 attacks
36. U.S. CoNsT. amends. V, XIV (due process). CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15. Roth v. Regents
of the Univ. of Cal., 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972) (life, liberty, and property may not be taken
by the state without fair procedures). See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 285 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (cautioning that the vice to be guarded against is the potential
for arbitrary action by officials). See generally Note, Void for Vagueness Doctrine, 109 U.
PA. L. REv. 67 (1960) (discussion of the disharmonies within bodies of cases applying this
doctrine).
37. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. See generally 1987 PAC. L.J. Rv. Nav.
LEGIS. 142 (review of Nevada Revised Statute sections 201.358 (prostitution after a positive
AIDS blood test is a felony), 439.215 (a blood test for AIDS must be at least 95016 reliable));
Schatz, The AIDS Insurance Crisis: Underwriting or Overreaching?, 100 HA~v. L. REv. 1782,
1797 (1987) (the tests used were oversensitive since they were designed for blood screening and
were misused). But see generally Clifford & luculano, AIDS and Insurance: The Rationale for
AIDS Related Testing, 100 HARv. L. Rav. 1806, 1812 (1987) (the series of two successive
positive ELISA tests and a reactive Western Blot Assay is considered 99.9% accurate).
38. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1202.1(a), 1202.6(e). See Peranzo v. Coughlin, 608 F. Supp.
1504, 1511 (D.C.N.Y. 1985) (the court allowed a drug test with a margin of error of less than
407/ to be used on a prison inmate). See also Wykoff v. Resig, 613 F. Supp. 1504, 1512 (D.C.
Ind. 1985) (to afford prisoner appropriate due process, all positive results of Enzyme Multiple
Immune Assay Technique d.a.u. Cannobinoid Assay (EMIT) tests for presence of marijuana
should be confirmed by a second EMIT test or its equivalent before imposition of discipline
based on results).
39. CAL. CONST. art. I, § I (right to privacy is an inalienable right). See generally Gerstein,
California's Constitutional Right to Privacy: The Development of the Protection of Private
Life, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 385 (1982) (an evaluation of the development of the right to
privacy in California).
40. See Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 501-02, 421 P.2d
409, 411-12, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401, 402-03 (1966) (setting out a three pronged test for determining
when the government may impose conditions upon the enjoyment of publicly conferred
benefits). The Bagley test is: (1) The condition imposed must rationally relate to the enhance-
ment of the public service; (2) the benefits that the public gains by the restraints outweigh the
resulting impairment of constitutional rights; and (3) no alternatives less subversive of consti-
TtONAL RiGHTs ARE AVAIABiLE. Id. See also Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers,
29 Cal. 3d 252, 258, 625 P.2d 779, 781, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 868-69 (1981) (a statute excluding
payment of elective abortions under Medi-Cal was held unconstitutional because the statute
did not relate to the purpose of Medi-Cal, severe impairment of constitutional rights would
result, and the utility of imposing the exclusion did not outweigh the impairment of rights).
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the deadly problem of a convicted criminal's knowingly spreading
AIDS in prohibited activities, the statute may sweep too broadly in
permitting extensive distribution of the test results. 4'
In summary, Chapter 1597 is subject to at least three constitutional
challenges: (1) The blood test is an unreasonable search without
probable cause; (2) the failure to limit the test allowed can result in
a defendant being subjected to unreliable and inconsistent punish-
ment; and (3) the government's interest in controlling the spread of
AIDS does not outweigh the intrusion on the individual's right to
privacy. The societal and governmental need to control the spread
of AIDS is immense and society is unlikely to recognize the expec-
tation of privacy convicted prostitutes or sex offenders have in their
identity as an AIDS carriers. Similarly, a citizen does not have an
absolute right to privacy and the compelling state interest in con-
trolling the spread of AIDS through criminal acts should be sufficient
to overcome the privacy interest. Nevertheless, Chapter 1597 must
fall because it leaves too much discretion to the county officers in
defining the test. Chapter 1597 allows a local government to subject
citizens to potentially inaccurate tests and impose criminal penalties
as a result.
KMK
41. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.6(f). The previous conviction and positive test results will
be charged in the accusatory pleading and made available to the public. Id. § 647(t). See
generally Loder v. Municipal Court, 17 Cal. 3d 859, 553 P.2d 624, 132 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1976).
In Loder, the petitioner was denied writ of mandate to compel erasure or return of the record
of an arrest not resulting in conviction; the multiple purposes for which police, prosecutors,
courts, and probation and parole authorities may consult records of arrests not resulting in
conviction constitute a substantial governmental interest, and this is not outweighed by arrestee's
legitimate concern to protect himself from improper use of his arrest record. Id. at 867-75,
553 P.2d at 630-36, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 470-77. See also Schatz, supra note 37, at 1784.85 (the
results of a false-positive may have serious consequences, such as being fired, evicted, refused
services, denied medical treatment, and denied visitation rights).
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Crimes; street gangs
Penal Code §§ 186.20, 186.21, 186.22, 186.23, 186.24, 186.25,
186.26, 186.27, 422, 1001.70, 1001.71, 1001.72, 1001.73, 1001.74,
1001.75 (new); § 272 (amended).
SB 1555 (Robbins); 1988 STAT. Ch. 1256
(Effective September 23, 1988)
Establishes criminal liability for active participation in a criminal
street gang; defines criminal street gang; defines pattern of criminal
gang activity; identifies as a nuisance every building or place, with
certain exceptions, in which specified criminal conduct by gang
members occurs; establishes criminal liability for willfully threatening,
under specified circumstances, to commit a crime that will result in
death or great bodily injury; establishes a diversion program for
parents accused of contributing to the delinquency of a minor.
STREET TERRORISM ENFORCEMENT AND PREVENTION ACT
Existing law punishes participation in concerted criminal activity.'
In enacting the California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Preven-
tion Act (Act),2 the legislature declares that it is not their intent to
interfere with constitutionally protected right of association and
freedom of expression.3 Accdording to the legislature, criminal activ-
ities by street gangs are a clear and present danger to public order
and safety, and these criminal activities are not constitutionally
protected.4 Chapter 1256 is intended to eradicate criminal street gang
activity by focusing on patterns of criminal gang activity and on the
organized nature of street gangs.5
Chapter 1256 defines a criminal street gang as an ongoing group
of three or more persons, whether organized formally or informally,
(1) having as one of the group's primary activities the commission
of one or more specified offenses, 6 (2) having a common name or
1. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 31 (aiding and abetting), 32 (accessory after the fact),
182-185 (conspiracy), 1111 (accomplice liability). See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1984)
(federal Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO)). Cf. CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 186-186.8 (California Control of Profits of Organized Crime Act, the California
version of RICO). See generally I B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRmtas §§ 44-46 (1963 & Supp.
1985) (discussion of aiding and abetting, accessory, and accomplice liability).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.20.
3. Id. § 186.21.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See id. § 186.22(c)(l)-(7) (list of offenses which may show a pattern of criminal gang
activity).
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identifying symbol, and (3) whose members engage in a pattern of
criminal gang activity.7 A pattern of criminal gang activity is defined
as the commission, attempted commission, or solicitation of two or
more of the following specified offenses: (1) Assault with a deadly
weapon; 8 (2) robbery; 9 (3) unlawful homicide or manslaughter;' (4)
possession, sale, transportation, or manufacture of certain controlled
substances; 1' (5) shooting at an inhabited dwelling or occupied motor
vehicle;' 2 (6) arson; 13 or (7) intimidation of witnesses and victims.' 4
To establish a pattern of criminal gang activity, at least one of these
enumerated offenses must have occurred after the effective date of
Chapter 1256.'-
Under Chapter 1256, any person who is an active participant in a
criminal street gang, who knows that the gang engages in a pattern
of criminal gang activity, and who willfully promotes, furthers, or
assists in the criminal activity of the gang is guilty of an alternative
misdemeanor or felony.' 6 Chapter 1256 also provides for a penalty
7. Id. § 186.22(d). See id. §§ 186.24 (any part of this chapter held invalid is scvcred and
remaining provisions survive in full force); 186.25 (remedies of this chapter are alternative to
local laws, not preemptive, in instances where local laws supplement or duplicate provisionw
of this chapter). See also id. § 186.23 (the Act does not apply to employees engaged in
concerted activities for their mutual aid and protection or to the activities of labor organizations
or their members or agents); Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 482-83
(1970) (holding that a state may prohibit injunctions against unions to protect union activities
like peaceful picketing because there is no right to a remedy against lawful conduct). But See
Trustees of California State Colleges v. Local 1352, San Fransisco State College Federation
of Teachers, 13 Cal. App. 3d 863, 868, 92 Cal. Rptr. 134, 137 (1937) (injunction against
picketing in support of actual strike was not overbroad since violence resulted from the
picketing).
8. See id. § 240 (definition of assault with a deadly weapon).
9. See id. § 211 (definition of robbery).
10. Id. §§ 187-199 (unlawful homicide or manslaughter includes murder, vehicular man-
slaughter and gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, voluntary and involuntary man-
slaughter, but not justifiable or excusable homicide).
11. See CAL. HEALTH & SaFETY CODE §§ 11054-11058 (list of controlled substances).
12. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 246 (definition of shooting at an inhabited dwelling house
or occupied motor vehicle).
13. See id. § 451 (definition of arson).
14. Id. §§ 186.22(c), 186.22(c)(7). See id. § 136.1 (definition of intimidation of witne.ws
and -ictims).
15. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(c). The last offense must occur within thrce years of a
prior offense, and the offenses must have been committed on separate occasions or on one
occasion by two or more people. Id. But c.f. U.S. v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 58 and n. 7
(Conn., 1975) (a pattern of racketeering activity, as proscribed by the RICO Acts, can be
established by two acts occurring on the same day, in the same place, and forming a part of
the same criminal episode).
16. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(a). The offense is punishable by up to one year in county
jail or one, two, or three years in state prison. Id. Evidence of membership in a street gang
is usually excluded as evidence that the defendant committed other crimes because such
evidence is either too prejudicial or irrelevant. People v. Cardenas, 31 Cal. 3d 897, 903-910,
647 P.2d 569, 571-576, 184 Cal. Rptr. 165, 167-172 (1982) (reversing defendant's conviction
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enhancement for conviction of a felony or misdemeanor committed
at the direction of, in association with, or for the benefit of a
criminal street gang with the specific intent to promote, further, or
assist in criminal gang activity.1 7
Finally, the Act provides that any place or building's used by gang
members to commit one of the above crimes,19 or a crime involving
dangerous weapons, burglary, or rape, or where such criminal con-
duct occurs, is a public and private nuisance. 20 The nuisance must
be enjoined, abated, and prevented, and damages may be recovered. 2'
Thirty day notice of the criminal conduct or use must be given to
the owner before any suit may be filed. 22
for attempted murder, attempted robbery and assault with a deadly weapon because evidence
of defendant's membership in a criminal street gang and defendant's drug addiction caused
cumulative prejudice). See People v. Perez, 114 Cal. App. 3d 470, 476-479, 170 Cal. Rptr.
619, 622 (1981) (reversing defendant's conviction for robbery and car theft because trial court
erroneously admitted evidence of defendant's criminal gang membership, thus allowing unrea-
sonable inference that defendant was guilty by association); In re Wing Y., 67 Cal. App. 3d
69, 77-79, 136 Cal. Rptr. 390, 394-96 (1982) (allowing evidence that defendant was a member
of a criminal street gang was reversible error because the evidence was too prejudicial and not
relevant to robbery charge). But cf. People v. Plasencia, 168 Cal. App. 3d 546, 552-553, 223
Cal. Rptr. 786, 789 (1985) (admitting evidence of gang membership was proper for limited
purpose of showing motive where jury was instructed that gang membership alone does not
establish guilt).
17. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(b). If the underlying conviction is for a misdemeanor, the
punishment for the street gang membership violation is from 180 days to 1 year in county jail
or 1, 2, or 3 years in state prison. Id. § 186.22(b)(1). A minimum of 180 days must be served
if the court grants probation or suspends execution of the sentence. Id. If the underlying
conviction is for a felony or attempted felony, the punishment may be enhanced by an
additional term of one, two, or three years, to be served consecutive to the underlying
punishment. Id. § 186.22(b)(2). The court must impose a two year enhancement unless there
are aggravating or mitigating circumstances and the court states on the sentencing hearing
record the reasons for choice of enhancement. Id. If the underlying felony conviction is
punishable by life in prison, the defendant must serve a minimum of fifteen calendar years
before parole may be considered. Id. § 186.22(b)(3). However, in the interests of justice, the
court may forego enhancement in an unusual case provided the court specifies on the record
the circumstances supporting that disposition. Id. § 186.22(b)(4).
18. Id. § 186.22a(a) (residential building with less than four units is exempted from the
Act).
19. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 186.22(c)(l)-(7) (list of crimes which may show a pattern of
criminal gang activity).
20. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22a(a).
21. Id. Injunction and abatement actions must proceed in accordance with Health and
Safety Code sections 11570-11587 except that: (1) No civil penalty may be assessed unless the
defendant knew or should have known of the unlawful acts; (2) eviction or closure orders
may not be issued; and (3) any injunction must be designed to prevent further criminal activity
or to protect the residents or public. Id. §§ 186.22a(b)(1)-(3). See CAL. HEALTH & SAFET
CODE §§ 11570-11587 (procedure for filing injunction and abatement actions). Governmental
entities and nonprofit or charitable organizations are exempt from abatement. CAL. PENAL
CODE § 186.22a(c). All other legal remedies are available to aggrieved persons. Id. § 186.22a(d).
22. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22a(b)(4).
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TERRORIST THREATS
Prior law punished as a felony any threat to commit a crime that
would result in death or great bodily injury, with intent to terrorize
another, or with reckless disregard of the risk of terrorizing another.2 1
In People v. Mirmirani,24 the California Supreme Court concluded
that the prior provision was unconstitutionally vague.25 In apparent
response to that case, Chapter 1256 imposes felony liability for
willfully threatening to commit a crime that can result in death or
great bodily injury to another person. 26 The threat must be made
with the specific intent that the statement be perceived as a threat,
even if there is no intent to actually carry out the threat. 2  The
threat, facially and under the circumstances, must be so unequivocal,
unconditional, immediate and specific as to convey to the victim a
grave purpose and immediate prospect of execution. 28 To be punish-
able, the threat also must cause the victim to reasonably fear for
personal safety or the safety of the victim's immediate family."
PARENTAL DIVERSION
Chapter 1256 establishes a diversion ° program for a parent or
23. 1987 Cal. Stat. ch. 828, sec. 28, at - (repealing CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 422, 422.5).
Prior law imposed felony liability on one who intentionally threatened to commit specific
crimes, to achieve social or political goals, that: (1) Caused another to fear for personal safety
or the victim's family's safety; (2) caused the evacuation of a building; (3) caused interference
with public services; or (4) otherwise caused serious disruption of public activities. Id. See
generally 1 B. WrrKIN, CALIFoRNIA CRiEs § 364C (1963 & Supp. 1985) (terrorist threats).
24. 30 Cal. 3d 375, 636 P.2d 1130, 178 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1981).
25. Mirmirani, 30 Cal. 3d at 388, 636 P.2d at 1138, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 300. Mirmirani,
who had made vague threats against the children of two police officers who had earlier arrested
him for possession of marijuana, was arrested and charged under Penal Code sections 422
and 422.5. Id at 379-80, 636 P.2d at 1132-1133, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 794. The court held that
the statutory phrase in order to achieve social or political goals was unconstitutionally vague
because the court could discern no statutory or judicial definition of social or political goals.
Id. at 386-88, 636 P.2d at 1134-1138, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 798-800. The court stated in dicta that
the legislature may constitutionally penalize threats, even though the threats are only talk, if
the statute is narrowly directed only to threats which truly pose a danger to society. Id. at
388 n. 10, 636 P. 2d at 1138 n. 10, and 178 Cal. Rptr. at 800 n. 10.
26. CAL. PEN. CODE § 422.
27. Id.
28. See United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1976) (a threat can be
penalized only if, facially and under the circumstances, the threat is so unequivocal, uncon-
ditional, immediate, and specific as to the person threatened as to convey a gravity of purpose
and imminent prospect of execution).
29. CAL. PENAL CODE § 422. The victim's immediate family includes any spouse, parent,
child, any person related by consanguinity or affinity in the second degree, or any other
person who regularly resides in the house or who did regularly reside in the house within the
prior six months. Id.
30. Pretrial diversion means the postponement of prosecution, either temporarily or
permanently, at any time in the judicial process between the filing of the complaint and
adjudication. Id. § 1001.70(b). Cf. id. § 1001.50 (misdemeanor diversion program).
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legal guardian who has been charged with contributing to the delin-
quency of a minor.3 To qualify for diversion, the defendant must
consent to diversion and waive the right to a speedy trial. 32 The case
will then be referred to the probation department to determine if
diversion is a viable solution for the defendant.
33
Following completion of the probation department's investigation,
the court must hold a hearing to determine if the defendant still
consents to diversion and waives the right to a speedy trial.
34 If
diverted, the defendant must perform satisfactorily in the program,
must benefit3 5 from the program, and must not be convicted during
the diversion period of a felony or a misdemeanor in which force or
violence was used.3 6 If the defendant fails to meet these requirements,
the court must hold a hearing to determine whether to reinstate
criminal proceedings against the defendant. 37 After the defendant has
31. Id. §§ 1001.70-1001.75. See id. § 272 (defining the crime of contributing to the
delinquency of a minor). Compare 1979 Cal. Stat. ch. 373, sec. 237, at 1349 (amending Penal
Code section 272) (defining the crime of contributing to the delinquency of a minor but
enumerating no standard of care required of parent or guardian) with CAL. PENAL CODE
(amending Penal Code section 272) (adding that a parent or guardian must exercise reasonable
care, supervision, protection and control over a minor child).
32. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1001.72(a). Additionally, to be eligible for diversion, the defen-
dant's record must indicate that probation or parole has never been revoked without being
completed later. Id. § 1001.71(a). Nor may the defendant have been in the diversion program
on any prior occasion. Id. § 1001.71(b).
33. Id. § 1001.72(a). The probation department must determine whether the defendant
qualifies for diversion and would benefit by education, treatment or rehabilitation. Id. The
probation department must report findings and recommendations to the court and, if the
recommendation includes a referral to a community program, the report must indicate that
the program will accept the defendant and how that program's services can assist the defendant.
Id.
34. Id. § 1001.73. The probation department's report and any other relevant information
will be considered. Id. No statement regarding the alleged crime, or information derived from
any statement, made by the defendant to a probation officer, prior to the probation depart-
ment's investigation and report, or after diversion is granted, may be used in any proceeding
or action against the defendant. Id. § 1001.72(b). If diversion is denied or later revoked,
neither the probation investigation nor any statements made by the defendant during the
investigation, or information derived from any statement, may be used in any pretrial sentencing
procedures against the defendant. Id.
35. Benefit apparently means that the divertee must achieve additional education, insight,
ability to control behavior, or any other goals set by the divertee's individualized program.
Telephone conversation with Bruce Coplen, Los Angeles Deputy City Attorney (Oct. 7, 1988)
(notes on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
36. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1001.74. Id. The court may require the defendant, if able, to
pay all or part of the costs of diversion, but not more than the actual average cost of diversion
services. Id. § 1001.73. At the time of diversion, the court must order the defendant's bail
exonerated. Id. Further criminal proceedings may be diverted for the length of time required
for the defendant to complete the diversion program, but that period may not exceed two
years. Id. If the defendant is not diverted, the proceedings continue as in any other case. Id.
37. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1001.74. If the defendant is not performing satisfactorily, or has
been convicted of a felony or violent misdemeanor, the case must be referred back to the
court where criminal proceedings against the defendant will resume. Id. See People v. Denman,
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successfully completed diversion, the arrest upon which the diversion
was based is deemed to have never occurred, and the defendant may
indicate that he was not arrested or diverted for that offense. '
COMMENT
The California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act
may raise constitutional questions involving freedom of association,
vagueness or overbreadth, or a chilling effect on constitutionally
protected activities.39 The United States and California constitutions
protect the right of association. 40 That right is limited, however, and
the state may constitutionally curtail that right upon a clear showing
that the association or organization is actively engaged in lawless
conduct. 41 Further, for the state to punish an individual for being a
145 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 40, 48-50, 193 Cal. Rptr. 863, 868-70 (1933) (when defendant waived
speedy trial right under domestic violence diversion statute but was later denied diversion, the
defendant's right to speedy trial was reinstated on the date diversion was denied or refused,
and the state then had thirty days in which to bring the defendant to trial or have the charges
dismissed). If the defendant has performed satisfactorily in diversion, the criminal charges
must be dropped. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1001.74.
38. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1001.75. See B.W. v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance, 16')
Cal. App. 3d 219, 232-233, 215 Cal. Rptr. 130, 137 (1985) (prohibiting the Board of Medical
Quality Assurance from relying solely on the report of an arrest for cocaine possession to
institute disciplinary proceedings against a successful divertee because the diversion statute
provided that, upon successful completion of diversion, the arrest was deemed to have never
occurred).
39. See infra, notes 41-61 and accompanying text (discussion of associational rights,
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, and chilling effect).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. I; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 3. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449 (1958). The court overruled the Alabama Supreme Court's order compelling the NAACP
to disclose membership, holding that compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups may
constitute restraint on freedom of association, and that freedom to engage in association for
the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the liberty assured by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech. Id.
at 460.
41. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 31 (aiding and abetting), 32 (accessory after the fact),
182-185 (conspiracy), 1111 (accomplice liability); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-
517 (1951) (upholding Dennis' conviction under the Smith Act because Dennis had conspired
with others to advocate the overthrow of the U.S. government and that advocacy presented a
clear and present danger of inciting others to violence). See also 13 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1984)
(federal Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO)). Cf. CAL. PENAL,
CODE §§ 186-186.8 (California Control of Profits of Organized Crime Act, the California
version of RICO). The right of association cases were primarily based on free speech and
political action challenges. See e.g. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U S. 444, 447 (1969) (reversing
conviction of Ku Klux Klan leader under Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute because the
statute was not limited to advocacy which would present a clear and present danger of inciting
imminent lawless action and be likely to induce lawless action). See generally L. TRtIB,
AmRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 12-9 (2d ed., 1988) (discussing history of freedom of
association and Beandenburg), Redish, Advocacy of Unlalsful Conduct and the First Amend-
ment: In Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1159 (1982) (discussing
history of freedom of association and Brandenburg, and the clear and present danger standard
as articulated in the Brandenburg line of cases), 1 B. WmiKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES §§ 44-46
(1963 & Supp. 1985) (discussion of aiding and abetting, accessory, and accomplice liability).
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member, leader or organizer of an association, the state must prove
that the individual knew of the organization's illegal conduct and
either shared in or specifically intended to further the group's illegal
aims.4 2 Although the Act raises freedom of association questions by
proscribing membership in a gang, the requirements that the accused
knew of the gang's criminal activites and had the specific intent to
assist or promote those activities tend to limit the application of the
Act to individuals participating in groups that actually engage in
lawless conduct .4  Therefore, the Act may not violate the constitu-
tional right of freedom of association."
Due process requirements 4 prohibit statutes that are so broad that
constitutionally protected activities may be included within the realm
of punishable activities. 46 Further, statutes must be specific enough
to provide adequate notice of what conduct is proscribed.41 A statute
is facially void if the statute is so broad or so vague that people of
ordinary intelligence must guess as to whether particular conduct is
innocent or illegal. 48
42. See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 219-24 (1961) (mere association with a
group having both legal and illegal aims cannot be punished unless the defendant knows of
the illegal aims and either shares in or specifically intends to further those aims).
43. See CA. PENAL CODE § 186.22(a) (defining crime of participating in a street gang).
44. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
45. U.S. CoNsr., amend. V; XIV, § 1; CAL. CONST., art. I, § 7.
46. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). When a statute regulates conduct as
opposed to pure speech, the statute's overbreadth must not only be real, but substantial as
well, judged in relation to the plainly legitimate sweep of the statute. Id. at 615. In Broadrick,
state law prohibitied civil service employees from taking part in any political affairs, parties
or campaigns except to exercise the right to express opinions and to vote as private citizens.
Id. at 602-06 & n. 1. Although the court found that the overbreadth was real, in that the law
possibly reached protected acts such as wearing campaign buttons, the court held that those
applications of the statute, though substantial in number, were insubstantial when compared
with the legitimate applications of the law. Id. at 618. See also Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S.
641, 650-52 (1984) (in upholding a law which prohibited most photographic reproduction of
U.S. currency, the court refused to allow overbreadth argument because the record indicated
that the legitimate reach of the law dwarfs its arguably impermissible applications). Cf. New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773 (1982) (upholding conviction for distributing pornographic
depictions of children even though the court acknowledged that some protected expression
would fall prey to the statute). See generally, L. TRIBE, supra note 41, §§ 12-27 - 12-30
(discussion of overbreadth doctrine).
47. Burg v. Municipal Court, 35 Cal. 3d 257, 270-71, 673 P.2d 732, 741, 198 Cal. Rptr.
145, 153 (1983) (fair notice requires only that a violation be described with a reasonable degree
of certainty so that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited). See generally,
L. TRIBE, supra note 41, §§ 12-29 - 12-33 (description of void for vagueness doctrine).
48. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 457-58 (1939) (a state statute which
prohibited membership in a gang but provided no definition of a gang was held void for
vagueness because the statute provided no guidelines for what conduct was proscribed, nor
guidelines for enforcement). See People v. Glenn, 164 Cal. App. 3d 736, 739, 211 Cal. Rptr.
547, 549 (1985) (to evaluate a claim for vagueness, the court looks first to the language of
the statute).
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The Act's use of the words "any... group" and "a common
name or common identifying sign or symbol" in defining criminal
street gang, 49 and use of the words "active participation" in defining
the crime of gang membership,5 0 may provide the basis of an over-
breadth or void for vagueness challenge because those terms may not
adequately notify citizens as to what affiliations constitute a criminal
street gang or what activities amount to active participation." Yet,
the requirement that a defendant know of the group's criminal
activity and intentionally further the gang's illegal conduct potentially
limits the Act's application to affiliation with groups that actually
engage in criminal activity. 2 Also, since the crimes that show a
"pattern of criminal gang activity" are limited to violent crimes,
with the exception of controlled substances offenses," the application
of the statute is further limited.14
Under existing California law, when a statute is ambiguous, the
court's interpretation must be guided by the purpose of the legisla-
tion.5 5 The legislature's declaration affirming the right of freedom of
association 6 may further aid in overcoming an overbreadth or vague-
ness challenge by providing a court with evidence of the legislature's
intent not to interfere with constitutional rights. 7
49. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(d).
50. Id. § 186.22(a).
51. Lanzetta, 306 U.S. at 453; Burg, 35 Cal. 3d at 270-71, 673 P.2d at 741, 193 Cal.
Rptr. at 153.
52. See Daudert v. People, 94 Cal. App. 3d 580, 586, 156 Cal. Rptr. 640, 644 (1979) (all
provisions of the California Penal Code are to be construed according to the fair import of
their words). See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(a) (defining the crime of active participation
in a criminal street gang).
53. See CAL. PEN.L CODE § 186.22(c)(4) (including controlled substances violations in list
of crimes which may show a pattern of criminal gang activity).
54. Id. §§ 186.22(c)(1)-(7) (describing the offenses that may be considered when evaluating
whether a pattern of criminal gang activity exists). See Scales v. U.S., 367 U.S. 203, 211
(1961) (although the court will often strain to construe legislation so as to save a statute
against constitutional attack, the court must not carry this to the point of perverting the
purpose of the statute). See also Daudert, 94 Cal. App. 3d at 586, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 644 (all
provisions of the penal code are to be construed according to the fair import of their words).
Cf. People v. California Community Release Board, 96 Cal. App. 3d 792, 795-796, 158 Cal.
Rptr. 238, 240 (1979) (if ambiguity is found, the purpose of the legislation must guide the
interpretation).
55. California Community Release Board, 96 Cal. App. 3d at 795-796, 158 Cal. Rptr. at
240.
56. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.21.
57. Id. § 186.21. The legislature finds that there are nearly 600 criminal street gangs
operating in California and that the number of gang-related murders is growing. Id. The
legislature's intent is to eradicate criminal activity by street gangs. Id. Claims of vagueness are
evaluated by looking first to the language of the statute, then to the legislative history, and
finally to state decisions which have construed the statute. People v. Glenn, 164 Cal. App. 3d
736, 739, 211 Cal. Rptr. 547, 549 (1985). In California, if ambiguity is found in a statute,
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Finally, a statute must not be so vague as to produce a "chilling
effect" on constitutionally protected activities.58 Chapter 1256's lim-
itations on the definitions of criminal street gang and pattern of
criminal gang activity, the malum in se nature of the crimes specified,
and the statements of legislative intent in the statute may serve to
refute any "chilling effect" challenge to the statute.5 9 The Act is
likely to pass constitutional muster because the limiting language of
the statute and court rules for statutory interpretation would limit
the Act's application to those activities and associations which are
already punishable under laws prohibiting concerted criminal activity.
ALK
the interpretation must be guided by the purpose of the legislation. People v. California
Community Release Board, 96 Cal. App. 3d 792, 795-796, 158 Cal. Rptr. 238, 240 (1979).
The Supreme Court's "rule of lenity" requires that penal statutes be construed strictly against
the government and in favor of the defendant. Busic v. U.S., 446 U.S. 398, 406 (1980); People
v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 281, 287, 195 Cal. Rptr. 96, 100 (1983).
58. See Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614-616 and n. 4 (1971) (holding that an
ordinance that prohibited three or more persons from assembling on a sidewalk and acting so
as to annoy people passing by was vague in all applications and likely to have a chilling effect
on people engaging in constitutionally protected activities).
59. See supra, note 46 and accompanying text (the chilling effect must be both real and
substantial). See also Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 60 (1976) (upholding
a zoning ordinance regulating the location of adult movie theatres against a vagueness challenge
since the ordinance was considered unlikely to have a significant deterrent effect on exhibition
of films protected by the First Amendment).
Crimes; wiretapping
Penal Code §§ 629, 629.02, 629.04, 629.06, 629.08, 629.10, 629.12,
629.14, 629.16, 629.18, 629.20. 629.22, 629.24, 629.26, 629.28,
629.30, 629.32, 629.34, 629.36, 629.38, 629.39. 629.40, 629.41,
629.42, 629.44, 629.46, 629.48, 631 (new); § 631 (amended and
repealed).
SB 83 (Presley); 1988 STAT. Ch. 1373
SB 1499 (Presley); 1988 STAT. Ch. 111
Existing law imposes criminal sanctions' on any person who,
1. CAL. PENAl. CODE § 631(a). A fine not exceeding $2,500, imprisonment in the county
jail or state prison, or both, may be imposed for a first offense. Id. A fine not exceeding
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without the consent of one or more parties to a conversation,
intentionally taps any part of a communications system, or uses or
attempts to use any information gained by wiretapping. 2
With the enactment of Chapter 111, a law enforcement officer3 may
file a written application 4 upon written affirmation or oath with the
presiding judge of the superior court or another named judge to
intercept wire communications for investigation of specified drug
offenses. 5 The application must include a detailed statement of facts
relied on to establish probable cause justifying the issuance of an
order, including the amount of time required to intercept wire
$10,000, imprisonment in the county jail or state prison, or both, may be imposed for
subsequent convictions. Id.
2. Id. § 631. Evidence obtained by wiretapping is inadmissible in a judicial, administrative,
legislative, or other proceeding except as evidence in a prosecution for illegal wiretapping. Id.
§ 631(c). A person may record a confidential conversation with another to gain evidence of
extortion, kidnapping, bribery, annoying phone calls, or violent felonies. Id. § 633.5. See§People
v. Parra 165 Cal. App. 3d 874, 879, 212 Cal. Rptr. 53, 55-56, cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 57E:
(1985) (allowing evidence of a recorded conversation because the victim recorded the conver-
sation lawfully for the purpose of gaining evidence of the defendant's intent to commit a
violent felony after defendant sent threatening letters to the victim); People v. Murphy, 8 Cal.
3d 349, 361, 503 P. 2d 594, 602, 105 Cal. Rptr. 138, 146 (1972) (holding that in a prosecution
for first degree murder, a recorded conversation taken by police between an informant and
defendant, with the consent and knowledge of the informant, did not violate the defendant'.
Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable government intrusions).
3. Cal. Penal Code § 629. The law enforcement officer may be the Attorney General.
Chief Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Law Division, or a district attorney. See 5$
Op. Att'y Gen. 151-154 (1972) (only law enforcement officers named in the statute are exempt
from liability for wiretapping).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 629. An application must include: (1) The names of the officer.,
requesting and approving the application; (2) the name of the law enforcement agency to act
on the order; (3) a statement that the application and the circumstances in support thereof
have been reviewed by the chief executive officer of the law enforcement agency requesting
the order; (4) a complete statement of the facts and circumstances for a wiretapping including
a detailed description of the offense under investigation, reasons why regular police work is
unlikely to succeed or is too dangerous, a description of the place from where the communi-
cations will be intercepted, the nature of the communications to be intercepted, and the name
and description of any known suspects; (5) the specific time period needed to intercept
communications; and (6) a statement describing any known previous wiretapping applications
requested against a suspect named in the application. Id. § 629(a)-(f). To extend the period
of intercepting communications, the application must include an independant factual basis for
determining probable cause to think that additional incriminating communications will occur.
Id. § 629(e). An application for an extension must list the number of communication.
intercepted pursuant to the original order, the evidence obtained, or a reasonable explanation
for not obtaining any evidence. Id. § 629(g). An applicant may be required to submit other
evidence in favor of the application. Id. § 629. An application will be sealed by the judge and
held in custody for at least 10 years. Id. § 629.16. The application and orders may be disclosed
only on a showing of good cause. Id.
5. Id. § 629.02(a)(1). The drug offenses include the importing, selling, transporting.
manufacturing, possessing for sale, or selling of a controlled substance containing PCP.
methamphetemine, heroin, cocaine or their analogs where the substance exceeds 10 gallons by
liquid volume or 3 pounds of solid substance. Id.§
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communications. 6 Chapter 111 allows a judge to issue an ex parte
order7 granting a request to intercept and record8 wire communica-
tions only if ordinary investigative procedures have been unsuccessful
and probable cause exists to show that: (1) A person or persons may
commit, have committed, will commit, or are conspiring to commit
enumerated drug offenses; 9 (2) the place to be wiretapped will be
used in the commission of the enumerated drug offenses; (3) criminal
conversations will be seized by wiretapping. '0 Every order authorizing
wiretapping must include: (1) Any information concerning the identity
of the person whose communications are to be intercepted; (2) a
description of the place where the interception will take place; (3)
the identity of the applicant and agency authorized to intercept wire
communications; (4) a statement relating the communications to be
intercepted with the crimes the communication refers to; and (5) the
time limit authorized for intercepting wire communications.,'
Chapter 111 permits a law enforcement officer to apply informally
to a judge for approval to intercept communications. 2 The judge
6. Id. § 629(d),(e). To extend the automatic deadline, a law enforcement officer must
establish probable cause to believe that criminal conversations will continue after an initial
criminal conversation has been intercepted. Id. 629(e).
7. Id. § 629.02 (the judge may enter an ex parte order). The order must include: (1)
Any information on the identity of the person whose communications system will be intercepted;
(2) a description and location of the communications facilities where interception of commu-
nications will occur; (3) a description of the type of information sought and illegal activities
to which the information relates; (4) the names of the applicant and agency authorized to
intercept the communications; and (5) the time allowed for intercepting communications and
whether the interception must automatically terminate when the described communication has
been first obtained. Id. § 629.04(a)-(e). An order authorizing the interception of communications
must be only for the time necessary to gain evidence and may not extend past 30 days. Id. §
629.08.§After a judge makes an order, the law enforcement officer must submit written
progress reports to the judge at least every 72 hours explaining the progress or lack of progress.
Id. § 629.10. A sufficient explanation for acquiring the information is needed before an order
may be extended. Id. § 629.08. An order must specify that a communications entity, building
custodian, landlord, or other person supply the applicant with information and assistance to
set up the wiretap with a minimum of interference with other users of the communications
system. Id. § 629.40. Any person providing assistance must be compensated for the reasonable
costs of equipment used. Id. An order issued by the judge does not authorize a law enforcement
officer covertly entering into any house, hotel, or motel to install or remove any interception
device. Id. § 629.39. Further, Chapter 111 prohibits covert entry of such dwellings to facilitate
an order to intercept wire communications. Id.§
8. Id. § 629.14. Each recording must be done in a manner that protects the authenticity
and originality of recorded conversations. Id.
9. See id. § 629.02(a)(1) (drug offenses that may be investigated by wiretapping).
10. Id. § 629.02.
11. Id. 629.04. A wiretap order terminates when the conversations sought after are obtained
unless probable cause exists to believe that future criminal conversations will be intercepted.
Id. § 629(e).
12. Id. § 629.06.
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may give oral approval without an order if the judge determines the
following: (1) Requirements for an ex parte order are satisfied; (2)
probable cause exists to believe that an emergency situation threat-
ening life or serious bodily harm requires the immediate tapping of
a communications system; or (3) probable cause exists to believe that
the investigation of an enumerated drug offense has reached a critical
stage. 3
Under existing law, any evidence obtained by intercepting wire
communications without the consent of the parties to a conversation
is inadmissable in any judicial proceeding.14 Chapter 111 does not
permit evidence gained through wiretapping to be admitted into
evidence in a judicial proceeding if the evidence was obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
or if the defendant did not have ample time to review the wiretap
application, the court order authorizing the wiretapping, and a tran-
script of the evidence obtained by the wiretapping.' 6 Chapter 1373
excludes any evidence of crimes, other than those specified on the
application, from disclosure except to prevent the commission of a
public offense. 17 However, if the unauthorized evidence would have
been discovered inevitably, or came from a separate source, the
evidence may be disclosed or used in a judicial proceeding.'5
13. Id. § 629.06. A law enforcement officer must file a written application within 48
hours of a judge's oral approval to intercept wire communications. Id. The time period for
the application begins from the date of the oral approval. Id.
14. Id. § 632(a). See People v. Parra, 165 Cal. App. 3d 874, 212 Cal. Rptr. 53 (1985)
(the intentional wiretapping of a person's telephone conversation without the consent of either
party is illegal and any evidence gained is inadmissable in a judicial proceeding under the
exclusionary rule).
15. CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.20. Each party must receive a complete transcript of the
recorded evidence at least 10 days prior to a hearing, proceeding, or trial. Id. A judge may
waive the 10 day period if a delay in furnishing the contents of the recorded material wa,,
unavoidable and will not prejudice the defendant. Id.
16. Id. A law enforcement officer is prohibited from listening to or recording privileged
conversations. Id. § 629.30. Once an officer identifies a comunication as privileged, the officer
must cease monitoring the conversation for two minutes. Id. An officer may resume listening
to the conversation at the end of two minutes for a thirty second period to determine if the
conversation is still privileged. Id. Evidence obtained lawfully by persons authorized to intercept
and use such evidence may be disclosed to a law enforcement officer as defined in Title 18
section 2510(7) of the United States Code for appropriate law enforcement investigations. Id.
§ 629.24. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(7) (1969) (definition of law enforcement officer).
17. CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.32(b). A law enforcement officer may use or disclose evidence
of drug offenses other than those listed on the application if a judge determines on subsequent
application that the evidence was obtained lawfully. Id. § 629.32(a).
18. Id. § 629.32(a). Information received relating to other crimes may be used as evidence
to establish probable cause for a search or arrest warrant. Id. § 629.32(c). The defendant has
the right to receive a copy of the transcript of the recorded conversation used to obtain the
warrant. Id. The judge issuing the order must approve the use of the evidence only after
determining that the information was gained lawfully. Id. § 629.32(b).
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Under existing law, any person injured by illegal wiretapping, or
the use or disclosure of information gained by illegal wiretapping,
may seek an injunction and damages against the person committing
the violation. ' 9 Chapter 111 allows a plaintiff to recover, in addition,
punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, and litigation costs.
20
Good faith reliance on a court order authorizing wiretapping, how-
ever, is a complete defense in any civil or criminal proceeding. 2'
COMNT
Existing state law protects the people's inalienable right to privacy
22
by prohibiting unlawful interceptions23 of wire communications. 24 The
protection of a persons right to privacy, however, is a function of
state law and state judicial interpretation of law. 25 Consequently, the
enactment of Chapter 111 will permit only judicially authorized
interceptions of wire communications for certain drug offenses.
26
The United States Supreme Court decisions in Berger v. New
York27 and Katz v. United States" established criteria for drafting
statutes allowing judicial authorization to intercept wire communi-
cations. 29 In Berger, the Supreme Court listed nine specific standards
that a state statute authorizing wiretapping must meet in order to
19. Id. § 637.2 (a person may receive $3,000 or 3 times the amount of actual damages,
whichever is greater).
20. Id. § 629.36 (requiring actual damages of at least $100 a day for each day of the
violation or $1,000 whichever is greater).
21. See id. § 629.41 (including reliance by any landlord, public utility, custodian, or other
persons providing technical assistance).
22. All people have the inalienable right to pursue and obtain safety, happiness, and
privacy. CAL. CONST. art. I § 1 (1974).
23. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 631 (unlawful wiretapping or wire communications), 632
(unlawful recording of confidential communications), 632.5 (unlawful interception of cellular
radio telephone communications).
24. Id. §§ 630-637.5. The legislature intends to protect the people's right of privacy from
advances in science, technology, and sophisticated electronic equipment designed to surrepti-
tiously invade private communications. Id. § 630.
25. See Tavernetti v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 187, 194, 583 P. 2d 737, 742, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 883, 888 (1988) (the legislature expressly declared that the privacy provisions of the
Penal Code are to protect the people of California from illegal wiretapping). See also Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-351 (1974). The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution does
not provide a general constitutional right to privacy, but protects citizens from certain forms
of governmental intrusion. Id. at 350. The protection of a person's privacy is left to the law
of each state. Id. at 351.
26. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 629 (application for authorization of wiretap requirements);
629.02(a)(1) (probable cause must exist to believe enumerated drug offenses have been com-
mitted, will be committed, or are being committed by an individual).
27. 388 U.S. 41 (1966).
28. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
29. See Berger at 59-64 (1966), Kata at 358, 359 (1968).
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pass constitutional scrutiny 0 In Katz, the Supreme Court added the
requirement that a law enforcement officer to first receive a neutral
predetermination of probable cause as a constitutional precondition
before intercepting wire communications. 31 Following Berger and
Katz, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 196832 which legalized judicially authorized wiretapping."
Chapter 111 appears to adhere to the standards established by the
Supreme Court and Congress in requiring: (1) A neutral magistrate
to determine that probable cause exists to believe that a person has
committed, is committing, or will commit a serious drug offense;34
(2) each affidavit and order particularly describe the identity of the
person whose communications will be intercepted and the nature of
the conversations to be intercepted;35 and (3) exigent circumstances
must be present to warrrant the use of wiretapping.3 6 In addition,
30. Berger at 59-64 (1966). Justice Clark, writing for the majority, established the following
constitutional standards: (1) An affiant must have probable cause to believe a crime is being
or has been committed; (2) an order must specifically describe the particular communications
to be intercepted and the scope of the executing officer's conduct; (3) the court order can
only authorize limited intrusions for each showing of probable cause; (4) the court order must
be executed promptly; (5) conversations seized must have some connection to the crime under
investigation; (6) after the conversation sought after is obtained, a court order must terminate;
(7) a different showing of probable cause is needed to extend the wiretap; (8) exigent
circumstances must be shown to justify the wiretap; and (9) conversations seized must be
returned to the judge issuing the order before being used.
31. Katz at 359 (1967). The interception of wire communications is not an exception to
the Fourth Amendment standard requiring prior approval by a neutral magistrate before
authorizing police searches. Id. at 357.
32. Pub. L. No. 90-351 §§ 2510-2520, 82 STAT. 218 (1968). See generall' 1968 U. S. CODE
CoNo. & ADmiN. NEWs (90 Stat) 2156-2157 (the purpose of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act is to fight organized crime in America).
33. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1968) (federal statutes authorizing wiretapping).
34. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 629.02(a)(1) (a magistrate must determine that enumerated
drug offenses have been committed, are being committed, or will be committed), 629.02(a)(2)
(a magistrate must determine if probable cause exists to believe that a conspiracy exists to
commit any of the enumerated drug offenses), 629.02(a)(2)(b)(c) (a magistrate must determine
that probable cause exists to believe that communications relating to criminal activity will be
seized by intercepting wire communications at the location named on the affidavit), 629.06 (a
magistrate may make an oral authorization to intercept wire communications if probable cause
exists to believe that an emergency situation threatening life or limb justifies the immediate
interception of wire communications).
35. See id. §§ 629 (requirements for affidavit requesting wiretapping), 629.02 (requirement.,
for order authorizing wiretapping).
36. See id. §§ 629, 629.02. A law enforcement officer must specify that conventional
police investigative techniques have been, and will most likely be unsuccessful or dangerous.
Id. § 629(d). A judge must determine that conventional police techniques have been unsuccesful
and appear to be unsuccessful in the future. Id. § 629.02(a)(2)(d). The contents of a wiretap
may rot be used or disclosed unless the judge authorizing the wiretap order has approved and
sealed the recordings. Id. § 629.14. An order authorizing wiretapping may not authorize any
covert entry into a persons home, motel room, or hotel room to install or remove a recording
device. Id. § 629.39.
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Chapter 11 1 restricts the use of wiretapping to the time necessary to
achieve the wiretap order's purposes.
37
In analyzing nonconsensual wiretap cases, the California Supreme
Court in People v. Conklin" and Tavernetti v. Superior Court39
consistently relied on legislative intent to interpret the privacy
provisions40 of the Penal Code.41 The legislature, in enacting the
privacy provisions of the Penal Code, intended to balance the state's
interest in protecting an individual's privacy from the use of advanced
electronic eavesdropping equipment and the interest of law enforce-
ment in using modern technology in apprehending criminals. 42 Since
the apparent legislative intent underlying Chapter 111 is, in the
investigation of serious drug offenses, to permit only judicially au-
thorized wiretapping, in the absence of consent of any party to the




37. Id. § 629(e). An applicant must show that probable cause exists to believe that further
communications of illegal activity will continue before a judge can extend the time limit on
the application authorizing the interception of wire communications. Id.
38. 12 Cal. 3d 259, 522 P.2d 1049, 114 Cal. Rptr. 241 (1974).
39. 22 Cal. 3d 187, 583 P.2d 737, 148 Cal. Rptr. 241 (1978).§
40. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 630-637.5.
41. Conklin at 270, 522 P.2d at 1056, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 248 (1974) (the purpose of the
privacy act is to protect the privacy of California citizens from non-consensual wiretapping);
Tavernetti at 192, 583 P. 2d at 737, 742, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 883, 887 (1978) (the legislature
clearly chose to protect the citizens of California from surreptitious interception of wire
communications in enacting the privacy provisions of the Penal Code). cf CAL. CoNsT. art I,
§ 28(d) (prohibiting relevant evidence from being excluded in a criminal proceeding) and B.
Witkin, California Criminal Procedure, 1985 Supp. § 23(jj) (under proposition 8, the sole
basis for suppressing wiretap evidence in a criminal proceeding will be the Fourth Amendment).
42. CAL. PENAL CODE. § 630.
43. Letter from G. Robert Blakely, O'Neill Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School,
to Senator Robert Presley, reprinted in Interception of Wire Communications, CAL. Dist.
Attys' Ass'n Handbook (1988) (the California electronic surveillance legislation is one of the
more sophisticated and restrictive statutes among the 29 states, the District of Columbia, and
federal government authorizing wiretapping).
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